Sunday, December 9, 2018
so, 100 people show up at the border and claim refugee status.
three are actual refugees. the rest are just americans looking for free health care.
what you want is a system that can quickly identify the legitimate refugees and process them appropriately and just as quickly deport the economic migrants. that is the actual problem we're dealing with: how to weed the worthy out and then quickly dispose of the worthless. and, how do you do that? well, you need better data collection, to start off with, and you need to be able to get it from the source countries. you need more judges. and, you need to be able to act quickly and decisively when you reject somebody.
so, what we need are ways to speed up the process, and the things outlined in the document should help us do that, if other countries facilitate it.
unfortunately, the country we're having the biggest problem with as a source - the united states - doesn't seem interested in participating. but, if the ideas get standardized, they should trickle down.
three are actual refugees. the rest are just americans looking for free health care.
what you want is a system that can quickly identify the legitimate refugees and process them appropriately and just as quickly deport the economic migrants. that is the actual problem we're dealing with: how to weed the worthy out and then quickly dispose of the worthless. and, how do you do that? well, you need better data collection, to start off with, and you need to be able to get it from the source countries. you need more judges. and, you need to be able to act quickly and decisively when you reject somebody.
so, what we need are ways to speed up the process, and the things outlined in the document should help us do that, if other countries facilitate it.
unfortunately, the country we're having the biggest problem with as a source - the united states - doesn't seem interested in participating. but, if the ideas get standardized, they should trickle down.
at
17:31
this is a political document, and the reaction to it in canada is political, with the pseudo-left embracing it (as consistent with multiculturalism) and the right rejecting it (because they're racist).
and, i actually think the broader pushback should be at the united nations. the un should realize that if they're going to produce political documents then it's going to produce political reactions. then, they scold people for misrepresenting the information. but, why do they waste so much time on these non-binding resolutions that just end up as dubious talking points, in the first place?
so, i don't see any use in opposing it or supporting it, because it's not of any consequence, either way - it's just a political statement.
that being said, what we need is an agreement that makes it easier to deport people by facilitating greater communication between existing states. we've created a situation where people expect to show up at a stranger's door and be sheltered and fed - and that is a problem that we need to find ways to effectively reverse. there has to be a more efficient way to facilitate the return of rejected migrants to their source countries, in order to minimize the amount of time that they're being kept in poor conditions, awaiting deportation. and, this might be a step in that direction.
https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/180713_Agreed-Outcome_Global-Compact-for-Migration.pdf
and, i actually think the broader pushback should be at the united nations. the un should realize that if they're going to produce political documents then it's going to produce political reactions. then, they scold people for misrepresenting the information. but, why do they waste so much time on these non-binding resolutions that just end up as dubious talking points, in the first place?
so, i don't see any use in opposing it or supporting it, because it's not of any consequence, either way - it's just a political statement.
that being said, what we need is an agreement that makes it easier to deport people by facilitating greater communication between existing states. we've created a situation where people expect to show up at a stranger's door and be sheltered and fed - and that is a problem that we need to find ways to effectively reverse. there has to be a more efficient way to facilitate the return of rejected migrants to their source countries, in order to minimize the amount of time that they're being kept in poor conditions, awaiting deportation. and, this might be a step in that direction.
https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/180713_Agreed-Outcome_Global-Compact-for-Migration.pdf
at
16:52
at the very end, she mentions indigenous title, and this is in fact a
very limited specific situation where there is a good argument that
indigenous sovereignty (if not title, per se) is a way out, because the
area in question is outside of the douglas treaties.
first, the explanation in this video is rather bizarre; a head of state cannot just sign whatever they want, what they sign does remain subject to domestic law, and particularly insofar as it relates to the court's jurisdiction, in the domestic country. in canada, the way it's supposed to work is that the international agreement gets introduced into the house of commons, at which point it becomes domestic law, and subject to constitutional requirements. it is only after the agreement is "ratified" in the house that it gains any actual legality. so, if harper (or trudeau)were to sign an agreement, and the agreement were to be found to be unconstitutional, it would no longer be law in the areas under the jurisdiction of canada's law - the government can't just sign whatever it wants and then claim it's a contract and we're all on the hook for it. that's some kind of imperialist nineteenth century logic. harper wasn't an emperor; we don't even have an executive branch, in this country. nor is a country a corporation. he acts merely as a spokesperson, and can be overturned by the house, if it comes to it - even if that is only likely in a minority scenario.
fipa was indeed tabled in the house of commons, and is now a part of canadian law. so, if fipa were to be repealed in the house of commons, it is unclear what kind of legal recourse the chinese would have to claiming it's still valid. again: we don't have an executive branch in canada, so it was only law because the house ratified it, and if the house had not ratified it, it would not become law. so, can any country modify the terms of an agreement unilaterally? well, if they pass a law against it, they can - that's called democracy. and, while some quasi-judicial international body may order us to pay some kind of compensation for it, they can't force us to uphold something we've struck down in law, as that would be an infringement of sovereignty. democratic legitimacy trumps everything else, in the end.
so, that is one way to get rid of the fipa - to repeal it. we may be ordered to pay a fine, but we could do it. sure.
the other way out is to question if the government had jurisdiction to it, in the first place. indigenous title is not the correct legal idea, as it does not provide for real sovereignty, or the ability to override federal authority. but, the reality is that this area was neither conquered, nor was it settled, nor was it purchased. the actual reality is that the federal government really has no legitimate jurisdiction over much of british columbia at all, as it doesn't even fall under the area covered in the 1763 proclamation. the situation in much of british columbia, including most of vancouver, is, legally, best described as an occupation; it's not very different from the illegal israeli occupation of the west bank in terms of the rule of law, even if canadian soldiers aren't murdering people - or at least not every day, anyways.
so, if enough of the bc tribes could come together to make the argument, there may be some way to question the jurisdiction of the government over the area. this might be a s. 35 argument, but it wouldn't have to do with title. see, i'm being careful in what i'm typing, because the premise that s. 35 is even in force presupposes some kind of jurisdictional primacy in an area that was never ceded in any way at all. they may have to use s. 35 as a kind of trojan horse, but they'd essentially be making a kind of succession argument, which itself is linguistically imprecise, because they were never under the jurisdiction in the first place.
i believe this would be novel, and i'm not entirely certain how to do it. nor does this argument apply in most of canada, which was ceded in some way or another. there are also potential risks in requesting this much sovereignty - if they were to win it, they might wish they hadn't. but, there are some legal avenues here around the issue of sovereignty, in that particular area of british columbia, because there's not really a good argument that the federal government really has any jurisdiction, in the first place.
first, the explanation in this video is rather bizarre; a head of state cannot just sign whatever they want, what they sign does remain subject to domestic law, and particularly insofar as it relates to the court's jurisdiction, in the domestic country. in canada, the way it's supposed to work is that the international agreement gets introduced into the house of commons, at which point it becomes domestic law, and subject to constitutional requirements. it is only after the agreement is "ratified" in the house that it gains any actual legality. so, if harper (or trudeau)were to sign an agreement, and the agreement were to be found to be unconstitutional, it would no longer be law in the areas under the jurisdiction of canada's law - the government can't just sign whatever it wants and then claim it's a contract and we're all on the hook for it. that's some kind of imperialist nineteenth century logic. harper wasn't an emperor; we don't even have an executive branch, in this country. nor is a country a corporation. he acts merely as a spokesperson, and can be overturned by the house, if it comes to it - even if that is only likely in a minority scenario.
fipa was indeed tabled in the house of commons, and is now a part of canadian law. so, if fipa were to be repealed in the house of commons, it is unclear what kind of legal recourse the chinese would have to claiming it's still valid. again: we don't have an executive branch in canada, so it was only law because the house ratified it, and if the house had not ratified it, it would not become law. so, can any country modify the terms of an agreement unilaterally? well, if they pass a law against it, they can - that's called democracy. and, while some quasi-judicial international body may order us to pay some kind of compensation for it, they can't force us to uphold something we've struck down in law, as that would be an infringement of sovereignty. democratic legitimacy trumps everything else, in the end.
so, that is one way to get rid of the fipa - to repeal it. we may be ordered to pay a fine, but we could do it. sure.
the other way out is to question if the government had jurisdiction to it, in the first place. indigenous title is not the correct legal idea, as it does not provide for real sovereignty, or the ability to override federal authority. but, the reality is that this area was neither conquered, nor was it settled, nor was it purchased. the actual reality is that the federal government really has no legitimate jurisdiction over much of british columbia at all, as it doesn't even fall under the area covered in the 1763 proclamation. the situation in much of british columbia, including most of vancouver, is, legally, best described as an occupation; it's not very different from the illegal israeli occupation of the west bank in terms of the rule of law, even if canadian soldiers aren't murdering people - or at least not every day, anyways.
so, if enough of the bc tribes could come together to make the argument, there may be some way to question the jurisdiction of the government over the area. this might be a s. 35 argument, but it wouldn't have to do with title. see, i'm being careful in what i'm typing, because the premise that s. 35 is even in force presupposes some kind of jurisdictional primacy in an area that was never ceded in any way at all. they may have to use s. 35 as a kind of trojan horse, but they'd essentially be making a kind of succession argument, which itself is linguistically imprecise, because they were never under the jurisdiction in the first place.
i believe this would be novel, and i'm not entirely certain how to do it. nor does this argument apply in most of canada, which was ceded in some way or another. there are also potential risks in requesting this much sovereignty - if they were to win it, they might wish they hadn't. but, there are some legal avenues here around the issue of sovereignty, in that particular area of british columbia, because there's not really a good argument that the federal government really has any jurisdiction, in the first place.
at
13:52
nafta was not a free trade agreement.
proof:
not
a
free
trade
agreement
qed.
but, the reason it wasn't a free trade agreement is because the tariffs had already been slowly broken down, starting with the gatt. what the mcdonald commission called for was a standardization agreement. what nafta really is is an investors' rights agreement.
so, nafta doesn't have anything to do with tariffs, and signing a new nafta isn't going to strengthen or loosen existing tariffs. that's the fundamental point the left tried to get across in the 80s - this has nothing to do with free trade. we need to separate these ideas in our heads.
the new nafta will not act as a counter-balance to rising american protectionist rhetoric, or the policy likely to come out of it.
and, how long did canada have to wait for a loosening of tariffs under the last round of american protectionism?
well, reciprocity ended in 1866, arguably as a consequence of the civil war - and this was arguably a push factor in confederation, to get an understanding of how important trade with the united states is for canada.
the gatt was 1947.
the auto pact was 1965.
the fta was 1988.
it could be a very long while before the situation reverses; we shouldn't assume this is in the short run. that is not evidence-based thinking, it is wishful projection.
proof:
not
a
free
trade
agreement
qed.
but, the reason it wasn't a free trade agreement is because the tariffs had already been slowly broken down, starting with the gatt. what the mcdonald commission called for was a standardization agreement. what nafta really is is an investors' rights agreement.
so, nafta doesn't have anything to do with tariffs, and signing a new nafta isn't going to strengthen or loosen existing tariffs. that's the fundamental point the left tried to get across in the 80s - this has nothing to do with free trade. we need to separate these ideas in our heads.
the new nafta will not act as a counter-balance to rising american protectionist rhetoric, or the policy likely to come out of it.
and, how long did canada have to wait for a loosening of tariffs under the last round of american protectionism?
well, reciprocity ended in 1866, arguably as a consequence of the civil war - and this was arguably a push factor in confederation, to get an understanding of how important trade with the united states is for canada.
the gatt was 1947.
the auto pact was 1965.
the fta was 1988.
it could be a very long while before the situation reverses; we shouldn't assume this is in the short run. that is not evidence-based thinking, it is wishful projection.
at
12:36
is it unfair that we have to scramble to adjust and restructure as a consequence of decisions made in a different country?
is it undemocratic?
sure.
and, that's what the anti-nafta protesters (the elder trudeau, included) were trying to point out, in the 80s and 90s - this agreement will make us completely reliant on the united states, for better or worse. we initially experienced this for the better. now, what was predicted has come to fruition: our minimal economic sovereignty is forcing us to suffer the effects of reliance, when america goes through periods of mismanagement.
getting to the root cause means reconstructing a measure of that sovereignty, and that is going to require a canada-first agenda in building canadian owned industry that is focused primarily on the domestic market.
it's not a contradiction, it's strictly causal.
and, if they are going to break the rules, we need to, too.
is it undemocratic?
sure.
and, that's what the anti-nafta protesters (the elder trudeau, included) were trying to point out, in the 80s and 90s - this agreement will make us completely reliant on the united states, for better or worse. we initially experienced this for the better. now, what was predicted has come to fruition: our minimal economic sovereignty is forcing us to suffer the effects of reliance, when america goes through periods of mismanagement.
getting to the root cause means reconstructing a measure of that sovereignty, and that is going to require a canada-first agenda in building canadian owned industry that is focused primarily on the domestic market.
it's not a contradiction, it's strictly causal.
and, if they are going to break the rules, we need to, too.
at
11:18
trudeau had to deflect from ford's suggestion that the recent plant closures were due to carbon taxes, but there's no more logic in tying it to the tariffs - the cars were simply not selling well.
i am not a trade liberalization fundamentalist; i think there is a place for tariffs and quotas. my opposition to trump's threat to use tariffs was not ideological, but practical: i doubted that trump had the tactical understanding and cognitive ability to use tariffs intelligently. tariffs are hard. and, because the united states and canada have comparable labour standards, ricardo's arguments are applicable: reciprocity makes a lot of sense across the great lakes.
that said, tariffs against mexico and china are in both the american and the canadian national interest. so, as it was previously, the situation is essentially a mess.
but, we need to be realistic.
donald trump is not going to remove the tariffs.
do we have leverage in congress? it's not likely - the democrats tend to be more protectionist at the congressional level, and they're ultimately accountable to voters that are even less sophisticated than trump is.
these tariffs will probably be there for at least six more years, and trudeau standing there and promising he'll have them lifted is equivalent to a union boss standing over a closed factory and promising to bring the jobs back. it's delusional.
rather than resist change and fight to turn back the clocks, canada has to adapt to the new reality, which is going to require federal dollars to build canadian industry that is focused on domestic consumption first, and new markets second.
and, this is not terrible, as it will make us more competitive and our industries more secure, when the next president (or the president after that) eliminates the tariffs.
the prime minister should be looking forwards, not backwards. but, this is consistent with him, isn't it?
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tariffs-canada-us-trudeau-trump-congress-1.4938329
i am not a trade liberalization fundamentalist; i think there is a place for tariffs and quotas. my opposition to trump's threat to use tariffs was not ideological, but practical: i doubted that trump had the tactical understanding and cognitive ability to use tariffs intelligently. tariffs are hard. and, because the united states and canada have comparable labour standards, ricardo's arguments are applicable: reciprocity makes a lot of sense across the great lakes.
that said, tariffs against mexico and china are in both the american and the canadian national interest. so, as it was previously, the situation is essentially a mess.
but, we need to be realistic.
donald trump is not going to remove the tariffs.
do we have leverage in congress? it's not likely - the democrats tend to be more protectionist at the congressional level, and they're ultimately accountable to voters that are even less sophisticated than trump is.
these tariffs will probably be there for at least six more years, and trudeau standing there and promising he'll have them lifted is equivalent to a union boss standing over a closed factory and promising to bring the jobs back. it's delusional.
rather than resist change and fight to turn back the clocks, canada has to adapt to the new reality, which is going to require federal dollars to build canadian industry that is focused on domestic consumption first, and new markets second.
and, this is not terrible, as it will make us more competitive and our industries more secure, when the next president (or the president after that) eliminates the tariffs.
the prime minister should be looking forwards, not backwards. but, this is consistent with him, isn't it?
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tariffs-canada-us-trudeau-trump-congress-1.4938329
at
11:01
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