and, you know what?
(b) the offence is deemed to be one for which the offender is punishable on summary conviction if there is nothing in the context to indicate that the offence is an indictable offence; and
(c) if the offence is one for which the offender may be prosecuted by indictment or for which the offender is punishable on summary conviction, no person shall be considered to have been convicted of an indictable offence by reason only of having been convicted of the offence on summary conviction.
Criminal Code to apply
(2) All the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by an enactment, and all the provisions of that Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to all other offences created by an enactment, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise provides.
i'm going to challenge the standard interpretation of the interpretation act. i think the precedent is wrong. this is what the statute says:
Indictable and summary conviction offences
34 (1) Where an enactment creates an offence,
(a) the offence is deemed to be an indictable offence if the enactment provides that the offender may be prosecuted for the offence by indictment;
Indictable and summary conviction offences
34 (1) Where an enactment creates an offence,
(a) the offence is deemed to be an indictable offence if the enactment provides that the offender may be prosecuted for the offence by indictment;
(b) the offence is deemed to be one for which the offender is punishable on summary conviction if there is nothing in the context to indicate that the offence is an indictable offence; and
(c) if the offence is one for which the offender may be prosecuted by indictment or for which the offender is punishable on summary conviction, no person shall be considered to have been convicted of an indictable offence by reason only of having been convicted of the offence on summary conviction.
Criminal Code to apply
(2) All the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by an enactment, and all the provisions of that Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to all other offences created by an enactment, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise provides.
to me, it seems obvious that this part of the code is meant to state that the machinery of indictable offense should only be applied to strictly indictable offences, and that anything that isn't strictly indictable should be interpreted as summary. that would appear to be the purpose of the subsection (2).
i've read enough case law to know that judges often actually aren't that bright, and sometimes apparently on purpose.
how did we get here? did somebody misunderstand this? let me understand this.
it shouldn't matter, logically speaking. 495(2) of the criminal code should supersede the interpretation act first, because it is explicit; the interpretation act should only kick in after 495(2) has been contemplated. but, it seems to me as though we've misinterpreted the interpretation act. or, that's my interpretation, anyways - i think this says the exact opposite of what the scholarship argues it does.