so, what do i think about the rebalance, or the pivot, or the strategic rethink or whatever you want to call it? well, i think the first point is that questioning what you want to call it immediately brings up the question of who the audience is for this, and i have to assume it's domestic - because the administration has to realize that the chinese are going to see past the marketing issues and analyze it for what it actually is. so, the question of whether this is a containment policy or not is really directed at the pacifist streak in the democratic base.
of course it's a containment policy.
but, see, even the language they use indicates a containment policy, it's just being marketed as some kind of reasonable containment policy. the united states is an established power. china is a rising power with the - distant - potential to eclipse it. no established power is going to try and work against the interests of a rising power. rather, it's going to seek to protect it's own interests and then attempt to interact with the rising power as a collaborator, perhaps to attempt to influence it to help carry out it's own goals. that's what a containment policy means in the existing context.
(edit: ask britain about this, regarding it's continuing influence over america)
now, that's a different thing than a containment policy of china fifty years ago, when it was trying to re-establish itself as an actual, existing state. and, it's different than a containment policy for a small, largely irrelevant state like cuba. it's just what a containment policy for a large, potentially powerful state looks like - protection of assets first, and then attempts at co-option.
so, to say that china is meant to be a part of the rebalance is not to deny it is a containment policy, it's just to define what a containment policy means under the existing circumstances.
do i think it's a good idea, though?
i think the idea of china striking a country like australia at any point in the near future is so distant that the chinese are correct to be alarmed by a military build-up in the region. 60% of the navy in what is essentially a colonial holding? so, that's the first point - it makes sense to protect assets, but this is being done with a level of force such that questions about possible offensive capabilities are more than chinese paranoia. it is reasonable to suggest that if it was truly about protecting assets then it would not be such a strong focus.
i also think that the americans are holding to certain positions that have no outcome besides conflict. china has every right to include taiwan and vietnam, at least, in it's sphere of interest. historical chinese claims on the phillipines have long expired but, beyond that, i think that the only region that america has any business seriously defending is japan. even south korea is an inevitable loss, and one that is not worth fighting for.
and, really what are the americans fighting for? the answer is cheap labour. they're trying to siphon out the chinese peripheral through "trade agreements" that reduce largely to plantations for american products. note that the chinese government continues to fund communist insurgencies throughout the region; the inevitable outcome of this is a string of proxy wars that america cannot hope to win.
truly partnering with china as a rising power - and containing them effectively - would require america to back out of certain relationships and hold to a broader peripheral.
there's no doubt that this is logically necessary, if your logic is imperial. but, it's overly aggressive and, if that is not reversed, it may succeed in creating the problems that it's meant to prevent.