the postal strike.

well, my light bulbs should be here by now, but probably aren't going to be for a while. can't i just go down to the warehouse and pick them up?

see, and this is the irony of it - the legislation is about how it's an "essential service". but, the reality is that it's anything but. the truckers are essential, but the people delivering the mail are truly obsolete.

socialism isn't reducible to supporting wage workers as an article of faith, it is an algorithm to arrive at a more free society, where people aren't stuck languishing in unnecessary work. we can talk over the internet. we can pick up our own parcels. and, we don't need the flyers.

the condition they should be demanding is retraining.

i'd just like to get my lightbulbs, thanks.

see, here's the thing - if i get the entry through a foia, it doesn't tell me what the border cops see.

i wonder if i can just ask the rcmp to show me what the border cops will see, in the foia.

also: i'm becoming more and more sure that it's that kid that's smoking up there. and, there's signals that he knows, too. hopefully, he deals with it.

why isn't google finding this for me?

i really don't think the border cops should have access to this information at all.

UPDATED MOC WITH THE FBI

98. While the RCMP did not accept to make further changes to CPIC or its guiding policies, it did update its MOC with the FBI, which was signed by both parties on October 27, 2015. The MOC now makes specific reference to respecting Constitutional and legal frameworks that protect privacy in both Canada and the US. It also now includes the following definitions, which are particularly relevant to our analysis:
    

    “Criminal Justice Purposes” means performance of any of the following activities: Detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, post-trial release, prosecution, adjudication, correctional supervision, or rehabilitation of accused persons or criminal offenders. The administration of criminal justice shall include criminal identification activities and the collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal history record information.

    “Criminal Justice Agency” means: A governmental institution or any subunit thereof that performs the administration of criminal justice pursuant to a statute, the common law, or executive order, and that allocates a substantial part of its annual budget to the administration of criminal justice.

99. The updated MOC also contains new language with respect to the disclosure and use of information under the arrangement:
    

    Pursuant to CPIC and NCIC/III policy, the use of the information contained in the CPIC and the NCIC/III systems is for criminal justice agencies for criminal justice purposes or for a consistent use thereof. Further to the definition of criminal justice purposes, the use of CPIC and NCIC/III data is intended specifically by law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in the performance of law enforcement and criminal justice matters, including counterterrorism/intelligence investigations.

100. The concept of “consistent use” is defined in the revised MOC to mean “a use that has a reasonable and direct connection to the original purpose(s) for which the information was obtained or complied.”
101. In our view, the reference to a consistent use would not support the disclosure of attempted suicide information to US border officials in the absence of a risk to officer or public safety. Pursuant to the revised MOC, in order for a use to be consistent, there must still be a reasonable and direct connection with the original purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a use may be a consistent use, for the purposes of the Act, when an individual would “reasonably expect” the information to be used in such a manner.^{Footnote 18}
102. As noted in our analysis under paragraph 8(2)(a), we do not believe that an individual would reasonably expect that information about an attempted suicide – which is highly sensitive information collected by Canadian police services during the course of policing activities – would then be used by US border officials to deny them entry into the US. Where the information does not demonstrate an ongoing risk to public safety, its use by US border officials for immigration assessment considerations is not directly and reasonably connected to the original purposes for which the information was compiled.

if this is true - and it's a good source - then the new law should apply to the border cops.

31. The RCMP advised that CBP has access to CPIC pursuant to a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) between the RCMP and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), providing for the electronic exchange of information contained in CPIC and the equivalent system in the US, the National Crime Identification Centre/Interstate Identification Index (NCIC/III).^{Footnote 8} The MOC originally took effect on May 6, 1999, and was renewed on July 25, 2008.^{Footnote 9} Unless otherwise noted, all references herein are to the 2008 version, which was in effect at the time of the incident in question.
32. The FBI is the part of the Department of Justice of the United States of America that enforces the laws of the US and facilitates the exchange of information with law enforcement agencies within the US. Pursuant to the MOC, the FBI authorized the DHS, and by extension, CBP, to access CPIC. The RCMP advised that the FBI was provided “read only” access to CPIC, meaning that the CPIC databases were accessible by the FBI and its partner agencies, but they were not able to contribute information directly to CPIC.
33. The CPI Centre also set limitations on the information in CPIC’s databases that could be viewed by the FBI and its partner agencies under the MOC. They were not able to access information relating to young offenders, persons wanted on province-wide warrants, non-conviction criminal records (i.e., not-guilty verdicts, acquittals, withdrawals, stays of proceeding, or peace bonds), or suspended (pardoned) criminal records. We confirmed, however, that the FBI and its partner agencies, including CBP, did have access to Caution flags and SIP entries.
34. According to the MOC, information obtained from either CPIC or NCIC/III could only be used for “criminal justice purposes.” The MOC provided the following definition: “criminal justice purposes is defined to mean that the use of CPIC and NCIC/III data is intended specifically by law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in the performance of law enforcement and criminal justice matters to include national security issues as mandated by the legislation of the respective countries.” The MOC did not define “law enforcement” or “criminal justice.”
35. The MOC specified that Canadian privacy laws and the CPIC Policy Manual required that users of CPIC data establish the accuracy and validity of a CPIC record prior to it being used. As such, all information collected from CPIC by US law enforcement agencies should have been confirmed by contacting the contributing CPIC agency to determine its accuracy and relevancy before the information could be used for any purpose.

https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-federal-institutions/2016-17/pa_20170419_rcmp/ 

ok.

i'm actually getting mixed information - the privacy commissioner's report is telling me they *don't* have access to withdrawn charges, but i can't find the actual memorandum.

i don't even know what's in there. i should be able to get access to it using some kind of foia, right?

it's the cpic database that they have access to. but, i should be able to find the memorandum, too, right? not yet.

i should finish my meal from yesterday.

i want to know what's in there either way, and that's probably the best next step. i want those coast files destroyed, too.

no, this is seen as "information sharing" rather than screening - but i think there's a good argument that this is wrong.

i'll have to see exactly what happens, but it could help the argument, at least.

it seems to depend on whether the border cops are seen as screening me for entry - in which case the new law should apply to them) or whether they're seen as law enforcement, in which case they should have deeper access.

i would argue they're screening me for entry. showing up at the border and requesting entry doesn't imply you're under suspicion for anything, right?

===

hi.

i know you're not an mp any more, but i'm trying to keep my queries about this away from the border patrol, and you did write the act. as the act just came into force, most of the information on the internet is outdated.

i was recently arrested without a warrant, charged with a hybrid offence, printed, released and then had my charges withdrawn due to no chance of conviction. it is my position that had the officer sought a warrant the arrest would not have happened and the entire situation was ridiculous. nonetheless, my prints are now on file.

the government's focus in it's press releases was on domestic applications in the new law, specifically for screening. my understanding is that this information could only be found on exceptional release through a vulnerable sector check, if conducted domestically. that's relieving, in some sense.

however, i'm more concerned about the border than i am about domestic applications. i have requested a file destruction, but it could take months, and i'm kind of upset about that. as i don't think any of this should have happened, i'm considering a serious constitutional rights challenge under s. 6. but, if these new rules also apply to the border cops, that would be entirely unnecessary, because you have beaten me to it.

so, considering that my charges are now dropped, what level of access do the us border cops now have to the cpic database? it doesn't explicitly state as much in the legislation. if the us border cops are considered to be screening me for entry into the united states - which is certainly true - then they should have the same access as anybody else that is screening. but, if they are seen as law enforcement, then they should have deeper access.

if you don't know the answer, i would appreciate any suggestions regarding somebody to contact that does. i don't want to call them directly, because the whole point is to prevent them from downloading information that i expect to be destroyed.

ok.

there was a recent change to the law in ontario, and i may be operating on information that is now out of date.

there are now three types of criminal record checks in ontario, and only the vulnerable record check allows for information on withdrawn charges. i actually don't believe that the border guards have access to a vulnerable record check. that means that this information may actually be hidden from the border cops.

i guess the best thing to do is ask.

hi.

i'm not a member of the bar, but i took three years of a law program at carleton (after having already graduated with a four year math degree) and feel comfortable representing myself in a constitutional rights challenge. so, i'm not looking for advice or resources. i'm just curious as to the level of interest that the ccla might have in the following case, as i believe it is somewhat of a novel argument, and may have some broad consequences for people faced with records as a consequence of frivolous charges.

i was recently arrested without a warrant and held overnight without cause on charges of criminal harassment related to repeatedly applying for housing. now, i'm not even comfortable claiming i'm innocent. for me to claim that i'm innocent would suggest that i didn't do the thing that i'm being accused of - and i make no such claim. i readily admit that i applied for housing in this complex over and over again, even after i had been asked not to. but, to suggest that this is in any way harassment under canadian law is preposterous. so, this isn't a case where i've been falsely accused so much as it's a case where i've been frivolously accused, and where the error lies not in somebody making false allegations but in incompetent police work. frankly, the officer seemed to have a poor understanding of the law; i was charged with doing something that is not against the law, in this country. while the charges were dropped (no chance of conviction) on a request for detailed disclosure, i was (i believe illegally) printed while i was in custody.

let us put aside the details of the case and accept the premise at face value: i was frivolously charged with criminal harassment and printed while in custody, only to have the charges dropped, leaving me with prints on charges that shouldn't have happened.

while i have applied for a file destruction, and think this ought to be a no-brainer due to the absurdity of the charges, the fact is that harassment is a secondary charge, and i may be denied on those grounds. this is where the rights challenge comes in, as i believe that rule is overly broad - as evidenced by my situation. and, i want to draw special attention to the fact that i'm not even accusing the complainant of making false statements, although i believe that she did. this isn't a denial of the circumstances, it's a misapplication of the law.

the novelty i'm bringing in is bringing the case forward on a breach of s. 6. i live in windsor, and frequently cross into detroit. if a border agent were to look up my record, it would simply see that i had charges of harassment withdrawn - and, without context, that could lead to me being denied entry. i am consequently not able to travel until the file has been destroyed. any refusal to destroy the file would consequently infringe on my mobility rights.

while the charges against me were uniquely frivolous, and this challenge is consequently worthy of filing, it is the broader context that i think may be of some interest to the ccla. you can't justify my situation under s. (1). you just can't. it's too absurd. and, whether the prints are destroyed or not, i have *already* suffered from a loss of mobility rights. if it takes a year to have them destroyed, then that is a year of mobility rights that have been lost. if it is going to take that long to have the prints destroyed in this context, then the law shouldn't have allowed for them to have been taken in the first place. a ruling at a high enough court could strike down the identification of criminals act by following a precedent in morgantaler, if the rcmp refuses to provide for destructions on a timely basis. and, i do think that speeding up the process of a full file destruction for the wrongfully or frivolously accused is something that the ccla would find some interest in aligning itself with.

i am currently awaiting a response on my request and will not know how to proceed until it arrives. judicial review is the most direct route to superior court. but, even if they approve the request, i could still challenge the law on the basis of the length of time required to wait for the destruction - using morgantaler as a template.

if the ccla would like to involve itself, it would probably be best to get involved from the start.

i didn't post an update for friday.

i have mailed the print & file destruction request, without the transcript.

i will need to get the audio recording of the hearing on monday.

i will be making some calls this morning and following up on monday afternoon.