Saturday, January 20, 2018

so, what's with russia and turkey, anyways?

well, they've fought wars in the historical period, and not just geographic skirmishes, but deep cultural wars that featured wild card barbarian groups that would take the side of one religion or the other. but, as is so often the case, these deep wars were really actually civil in conflict, as the russians and turks truly represented opposing views in a deep civil war over control of the roman empire, which had long reverted to a greek empire. it's an intra-hellenic conflict.

if you were to map out the areas under the direct control of the actual influence of greek civilization, rather than it's romanized abstraction, it would include both the areas under historical byzantine control and the areas under the control of the orthodox church. broadly speaking, that is the areas in the russian and ottoman empires, with lost colonies along the mediterranean coast, from magna graecia through france and into spain.

historians acknowledge this privately, but seem weird about publishing it: the ottoman empire was really just the reconstruction of the byzantine empire, under a cultural shift to a new religious order, which was maybe even a little more liberal than the previous one, in some ways. there was a population replacement to accompany the shift in religious order, but the empire ultimately survived, albeit under a new ruling class. it should be thought of as a revolution in the empire, then, and not the end of history that the christian byzantines believed that it would be.

it's amazing how that myth - that the fall of constantinople would be the end of history, as jesus would return - has, itself, persisted through the centuries, to continue to colour how we view the events of 1453. this was a revolution, and yet we call it the fall of a civilization - or the beginning of a new one, depending on your perspective. but, the truth seems to rather be continuity in the empire itself - that the hard-headed constantinople, clinging to the past, was finally brought in line with the changes that had already occurred through the rest of the empire. nor did byzantine civilization truly fall, as it was exported to russia, where it carried on; the byzantines lost their empire, but then quickly built a new one.

if there is any process in history, it should lead to these halves of the same civilization re-uniting as the cultural forces that ripped them apart dissipate into history. but, are the societies of turkey and russia ready to move forwards as a new empire - not just politically, but culturally? not for a generation, at least.

the partition of the eastern empire into russian and turkish halves is something that took place over centuries, and is complicated by the absorption and expulsion of a third empire, that of the persians. the initial split happened during the arab expansion, which both led to the toppling of the persian state and to the seizure of much of the eastern mediterranean coast. but, this itself was only possible because the romans were in the process of actually annexing the persians; if accomplished, this would have geographically been a return to the achaemenid empire. it was the persians who were conquering the byzantines from the inside out. the persian empire itself was split by the campaigns of alexander, but continued to exist in a loose federation of hellenic states. this was itself a revolution, from persian to greek cultural norms. - but the empire survived it. the romans presented the next outside and existential threat to the empire, but, by the time of the arab invasions, a thousand years after the romans fought carthage, the empire was finally about to absorb them. what is it to be an empire without an existential threat? but, the arabs were absorbed far more easily than the romans, and it was in truth a new persian empire that spread outwards from the middle east at that time.

the next threat to the persian empire came from the devastating mongol invasions, which left wide swaths of destruction and virtual depopulation in some areas. this was the closest that the persian empire, the cultural continuation of both mesopotamian and greek civilization as well as the inheritor of arab religion, came to actual destruction. institutions throughout the empire ceased to exist, forcing the empire to retreat to the iranian plateau, leaving the majority of the geographic empire in anarchy. the persian empire has truly not recovered from this devastation that happened in the thirteenth century, although it is as close to recovering today as it ever has been.

the turks were the group that eventually re-imposed order in the western part of the persian empire, but they did so by taking control of byzantine institutions and converting them into instruments of their own power. the rise of turkish power should consequently be seen as a counter-revolution of the greco-roman empire against the arab/persian empire, even if it adopted the religion of the latter. and, so, what we see by the end of the sixteenth century is a new greco-roman-turkic empire on the eastern side of europe.

the empire survived, when it's culture did not.

it's culture, meanwhile, fled to moscow - along with aristocrats and clergy. russian expansion began in 1463. eventually, the ruler of russia became the new tsar - that is the new caesar, the new emperor. there were sufficient byzantine bloodlines in the russian ruling class for the western emperor to acknowledge the russian emperor as caesar as early as 1514.

the russians and turks fought their first war from 1568-1570 and their last from 1914-1918, leaving the civil war in a state without resolution, and the southern partition under threat of reabsorption from the western empire, which is on the brink of moving it's capital from london to washington.

i've said this before: if there is any process in history, the eastern emperor will return to constantinople, in time.

jagmeet singh must cut his beard.
i guess i don't like the idea of presenting the situation as a choice between public funding and crowd-sourcing, as i think the better idea is to use them together: crowd-sourcing cannot replace the state in terms of resource allocation, but that doesn't mean it might not be useful to fund certain kinds of research that the government might fear political repercussions around, or might not fund due to corporate capture. for small fundraising purposes, it might be easier to crowdsource than to agitate, but i would dissuade people from disengaging from agitating for further public funds; this can't be a solution to that problem.

in this particular situation, though, i might suggest that a guaranteed annual income might be what would most benefit this researcher, as it would narrow the field of candidates down to the ones that have an engaged interest in the topic. conversely, this is a good example of how i'd imagine a gai would work: people would be freer to participate in their intellectual pursuits, be they in the arts or the sciences or whatever else.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/second-opinion-crowdfund-science-research-1.4495632

jagmeet singh must cut his beard.
so, who is this guy, erdogan, anyways?

well, like russia, turkey is in theory subject to periodic elections to change power, although the elections in turkey are somewhat of a joke, due as much to a disproportionate amount of power invested in the rural regions as due to endemic state corruption. like putin, erdogan would have probably won every election he's fought in without cheating, but that doesn't mean they didn't cheat, anyways, just to demonstrate they were in charge. i mean, if you can't rig the election, you're not really in power, right?

so, one way or another, he might not be around too much longer. but, the turkey he's going to leave behind no doubt will be.

now, don't misunderstand my conclusion, here. erdogan is a wily character, no doubt. there was a strange tradition in turkey recently, although i suppose it has it's roots in the iconoclast controversy, where the military would allow elections so long as the outcome remained a secular government, and launch a coup if the government was seen to be carrying forward any kind of islamicization. excuses about the first world war aside, what istanbul really feared was influence from mecca, and then from riyadh - it sought to separate the population from a millennia of history as a muslim province, much of it with illegitimate power as a usurped colonial force from the previous era, and instead assert a concept of turkish nationalism. for, it realized that the combined arab countries that it had colonized for so long were now a direct threat to it, should it conform too heavily to the culture in those states. it had to limit the influence of islam to avoid being absorbed by it.

whether these fears remained valid through the rise of arab socialism is questionable, but the tradition remained in place, nonetheless. upon first taking office, there was every reason to assume that the military would effortlessly remove erdogan should he work towards this goal.

but, erdogan did what no turkish leader had done before him - he reformed the military culture by purging officials thought to be capable or interested in carrying out a coup and replacing them with loyalists. so, when the united states agitated for a coup to replace him, it was unable to do so effectively. that arguably makes him the first fully independent turkish leader since ataturk.

a turkish declaration of independence from nato would have dramatic shifts in the global power balance, simply due to the fact that they would immediately become a regional power. i would not expect the turks to immediately end co-operation with nato, but increased co-operation with russia could neutralize significant strategic advantages that nato has in both the black sea and the baltic regions. and, of course, nato would lose a large, modern, capable standing army, even if it doesn't defect anywhere particular immediately.

so, erdogan was wily enough to change the structure of the state in such a way that he could not be removed in a coup. that's in some ways impressive. and, he seems to have the resources to do sneaky things in the regions directly around his borders to advance his country's own interests. the history is complicated, but, rather than fear russia today, he no doubt believes that turkey could eclipse russia in economic union, and ultimately become the dominant partner in a counter-european axis - an error that is hitleresque in potential scope. wily leaders are in truth best met with checks and balances.

but, while erdogan is wily at home, he is not so wily as putin is when it comes to foreign policy. he does not have the grasp on the games being played, does not have the grasp of tactics or strategy and frankly doesn't have access to the same resources, either in intelligence or in academia.

the empire is right to treat him as a dumb barbarian that can be easily manipulated through hot-headed outbursts of emotion.

jagmeet singh must cut his beard,
in addition to not being invited to bring troops in to syria, america was not invited to the peace talks in astana - and is not invited to help with reconstruction. america will be shut out from those contracts, which will go to russian and chinese firms. the announcement was merely meant to save face, as so many announcements about syria and iran are. the 2015 nuclear deal was about saving face; maybe what i've been saying for years about that is that much more clear, now.

but, why would america do this? is this just daft, as is suggested here?

tillerson doesn't make these choices, of course. he's reading a script (and sounds like it). these decisions come from inside the establishment that trump has chosen not to turn over. it's the same policy people from the obama admin..

turkey is in nato, but nato is losing turkey to russian influence. nato is also losing the kurds. now, it's not like the kurds can actually fight a war against the turks; they can carry out acts of resistance, but there was no kurdistan on the map, last i checked, and it is for that reason: the kurds have no chance against the turks..this would not be a war, but a slaughter.

why is turkey in nato? because it feared soviet expansion. today, turkey fears saudi expansion, and it is russia that is best positioned to counter-balance it. further, turkey has been poorly integrated into the european side of globalization, forcing it to look to asia for partners. there are no serious economic incentives for turkey to remain in nato, right now, and rather strong incentives to decouple. so, if no action is taken, nato is likely to lose turkey to russian influence.

given that truth, it is in america's interest to generate a conflict between russia and turkey. should the turks refuse to return sovereignty to the syrians, that is likely to create a conflict between the russians and turks. if the kurds are enough of a nuisance, the turks might decide they're not leaving. and, are the russians going to scold them for annexing syrian kurdistan? the turks wouldn't annex, they'd occupy, but you get the point.

but, that is indeed the miscalculation. as, such an occupation would actually serve russian interests, in creating a buffer zone of turkish militarization around their own bases, which are the focal point of the conflict.

this is what america does. because it is the empire. but, it's not always the best at it.


jagmeet singh must cut his beard.