Wednesday, October 16, 2013

misapplying gladue

R. v. Quash

            Bobby Quash suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome, a type of irreversible and untreatable brain damage. In his case, he requires an 'external brain' to function on a day-to-day basis and prevent him from making poor choices.[1] He has a long criminal record that includes a previous statutory rape conviction for having had sexual relations with a twelve year-old child while she was under the influence of alcohol that he had provided for her, and has shown "little remorse for this s. 271 and to some extent blamed the victim and showed disrespect towards females".[2] He was twenty years old at the time. He was noted as a high risk to re-offend by both the LSI-R and STATIC-99 risk assessments and placed into the care of a group home as a condition of his probation.[3] He is being sentenced in this case for a second rape, carried out while breaking that condition, of his aunt by marriage while she was sleeping beside his uncle.

            The judge quotes the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Whiskeyjack, 2008 93 O.R. (3d) 743 in determining the priorities to weigh in sentencing:

The task of the sentencing judge is to weigh the aboriginal offender’s circumstances and his or her interest in rehabilitation or restorative justice with the community’s interest in deterrence, denunciation and the need for social protection.[4]

After doing so, however, he focuses only on deterrence and denunciation, nary mentioning a further word regarding social protection! The primary issue in this case ought not to have been deterrence or denunciation but the safety of the community, and the perpetual threat that the defendant poses to it. In cases of repeat criminal offenders who continue to pose a threat of harm, the collective rights of the community for safety from that harm far outweigh any individual rights that the repeat offender has to personal liberty. That strong defender of individual liberty himself, Mills, would argue that the community has the inalienable right to protect itself from harm – this is his famous harm principle. As the defendant is unable to fully understand his actions or the consequences of them, there is no end to the risk that he poses. The risk will not end with a period of reflection in incarceration, with the help of a social worker, with medication, with education, with a promise to change or by providing him with any other sort of help. In order to protect the community from this risk, there is consequently no solution other than to remove the defendant from it - either through incarceration or by some other means. The pre-sentence report stated this clearly:

                        …without a group home style residence, with a high staff to resident ratio, coupled with an extremely stringent community supervision order, Mr. Quash will continue to put the community at risk for further sexual violence.[5]


            However, the judge focused solely on the issues of deterrence and denunciation, rightly or wrongly arguing that deterrence has a limited role to play in the case and that a mentally handicapped person should not be skewered on a stick and held up as an example for all of the rogue peasants to cower in fear over.[6] Without discussing the social science of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of deterrence in general, let us put this argument aside as inconsequential in the face of the more pressing issue of the community's right to protect itself. More important is that he then blatantly contradicts the scientific evaluation presented in the pre-sentencing report with some kind of base ideological liberalism in stating "I accept that Mr. Quash wishes to change his life from what it has been".[7] Now, to be fair, the judge does point out that placement in a group home would be ideal but that, as one is not available locally, and the defendant has indicated a desire to change his ways, a lenient sentence is preferable to lengthy incarceration.[8] This all rests on the assumption that rehabilitation is possible if everybody just tries really hard, which in this case is nothing less than the egregiously naive replacement of a solid scientific assessment by a wobbly philosophical assumption. A universe where deductive philosophy overpowers empirical science would be a beautiful one for us logicians to frolic in freely, but, alas, it is not ours; the report clearly states that the defendant does not have the cognitive abilities required to change his life from what it has been and must remain under constant supervision in order to not pose a threat to others.[9] Continuing to entertain the ideological fairy tales of liberalism in the face of hard science will not make anybody safer. Even accepting that the defendant has the ability to state whether he wishes to change or not is completely ignoring the weight of the scientific evidence, and perhaps even good sense as his counsel would not advise him to state otherwise, and should be viewed as bluntly incompetent. He clearly read the report; either he ignored it or he didn't understand it.

            In arguing for a reduced sentence, the court drew on case law to make a number of outlandish arguments that upheld the assumptions of rape culture. The first is that because the defendant did not continue to attempt to rape the victim further by inflicting force after he was pushed off, the assault is somehow less severe than it would have been had he done so.[10] Therefore, the sentence for this less violent rape should be shorter than the slap on the wrist that the more violent rapist received? In case law, two wrongs apparently make a right. The second is that "the aggravating impact of the prior sexual assault is not as significant"[11] because the prior rape was statutory and the difference in mental age was not great, despite the fact that the defendant showed little remorse. This trivialization of rape, and upholding of rape culture, was a strong factor in the lenient sentencing.

            He also makes a mockery of the criminal code by invoking a section (718.2(e)) that states that special attention needs to be drawn to the (socio-economic) circumstances of aboriginal offenders, and follows that up with a number of irrelevant comments about the residential school system. While it may be true that the lingering effects of the residential school system are deeply profound, and a lack of parenting (amongst other socio-economic factors) may be a root cause of crime in some circumstances, it is blatantly clear in this case that the cause of the defendant's recurrent criminality is the defendant's mental handicap, whether the result of abuse suffered by the defendant's mother or not, and not anything else. In the context of this specific case and the perpetual harm that the defendant poses to the community, there's no function in bringing up the topic and certainly no value in upholding the case as an example where leniency should be shown to a repeat offender who has been dealt a very bad hand and deserves another chance; this particular offender is incapable of being rehabilitated, so showing leniency cannot lead to any positive outcome. To the contrary, it can only increase the risk of further harm. The judge has really badly missed the point of this section of the criminal code, and the accusation of incompetence is pertinent on this point as well.

            As the pre-sentence report clearly indicated, no measure short of permanent incarceration in a jail or group home can eliminate the threat that the defendant poses to society.[12] While the ideal may be placement in a guarded group home, if the necessary resources to allow for this are not existent then the rights of the community to protect itself ought to take priority and the defendant, unfortunately, ought to remain humanely incarcerated until such a group home can be built.

LAWS 3504,
Sept , 2012

Also note that, unfortunately, Bobby Quash was, in fact, convicted of rape a third time.


[1] [30]
[2] [26]
[3] [25]
[4] [52]
[5] [28]
[6] [81]
[7] [82]
[8] [75-76]
[9] [28]
[10] [44-47]
[11] [50]