When
interpreted in its most literal and extreme forms, liberalism of the classical
variety is the definition of right-wing "anarchism". Anarchism, a
collectivist/socialist form of government that lacks hierarchy, is
actually a co-opted term in this context. When capitalists claim they are
'anarchists', or 'right-libertarians', what they mean to say is that
they are ideologically pure classical liberals. Certainly, these capitalists
don't really mean to say that they're anarchists, as anarchists are violently
opposed to all systems of exchange, which means that they advocate the
abolition of currency and the criminalization of markets - by collectively
applied force. As an anarchist in the legitimate sense, I'd appreciate it if
liberals would stop co-opting the term; I'm sure that liberals have similar
feelings regarding "democratic" socialists, quotes being necessary to
acknowledge that representative democracy is a contradiction in terms.
Marx would
argue that liberalism is the necessary antidote to mercantilism, and that the
socialist's role is merely to guide liberalism towards its proper end goal of
communism, arguing that they are phases of the same system rather than systems
in competition, which is an inherently capitalist description. The presented request
is consequently rather confusing, as time does not move backwards. The central
thesis of modern capitalism in its current, yet evolving, phase of socialism is
that the socialization of production renders liberalism as an impossible to
actualize contradiction. Liberalism requires individual production; individual
production cannot compete with socialized production. Therefore, the market
destroys itself, leaving new mercantilist masters, the bourgeoisie, in place of
the old ones. The assertion of liberalism as a dominant economic system is
consequently only possible with the reversal of industrialization, also an
impossibility. The goal of liberalism, self-ownership, can only be salvaged
through collective ownership of the means of production. In other words,
socialism is the liberalism of the industrial era; attempts to apply liberalism
to an industrial economy will backfire into mercantilism, as history records
the turn of the last century in America, and arguably the turn of the most
recent one as well.[1]
These
changes are consequently not reversions back to a mercantilist era of
hierarchical ownership but progressions forward into a new era of collective,
mutual ownership, as driven by irreversible technological innovations in
production. They can only be understood properly, or even coherently, as the result
of this technological march forward. There consequently may be a conflict at
work between individual and social concerns, but this is drastically different
than the assertion of hierarchical control for the purposes of enforced
altruist outcomes; comparisons are largely illusory and circumstantial at best.
Specifically, considering the duo of cases, Gillet v. Holt and Yeoman’s
Row v Cobbe, there is not much of a conflict between self-interest and
altruism at all.
In truth, in
Gillet v. Holt, the court upheld socialistic concepts of labour and
property as more valuable than liberal ideas of contractual obligation and
self-ownership, especially in relation to labour, as well as propertarianism, while
merely using the ideas of 'expectation' and 'reliance' as an excuse. The
initial ruling was probably actually the correct one, relative to liberal
capitalist ideas about contract law. In Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe, the court awarded
a personal remedy to compensate Cobbe for his time and effort rather than a
proprietary estoppel, but there wasn't a valid contract to uphold and
consequently no liberal contract theory to critique or uphold. Nor can the
decision (or it's other possible outcome) be characterized in any particular
social context, other than as a clash between two self-interested parties and
with an outcome that couldn't have benefited anybody other than themselves. While
this presents Cobbe as a case where self-interest was upheld, it is only
in the sense of the self-interest of one party being upheld over the
self-interest of the other. If there is an illiberal context to the case, it
lies in the proprietary estoppel, which is conceptually incompatible with
private property rights. In that sense, the cases could be contrasted relative
to their conception of property rights, but this wouldn't be a particular deep
observation, nor answer the question as interpreted.
So, I'm not
fully following the question. I no longer have time to remedy that problem. I
do not feel that I am at fault, either, as the question appears to be based on
liberal ideas that were empirically proven false many years ago and are rather
difficult to make sense of more than a century later. Unfortunately, democracy
seems to have failed science class. So, while I can talk a little bit more
about each case, I don't see a proper contrast to draw.
In Gillet
v. Holt, the proprietary estoppel that is eventually granted is very weakly
argued for, only enough to come to the correct moral conclusion that enforcing
liberal contract law in this circumstance would be unjust. The judge barely
even attempts to show a detriment that would stand up in court, opting instead
to run through a tear-jerking summary of the case that shows plenty of hardship
and unfortunate circumstances but almost nothing of any legal value. He even
goes so far as to suggest that should the estoppel not be granted then
there would be detriment, but this is a questionable approach, as true as it
may be. After this comprehensive and successful attempt to emotionally
manipulate the audience is complete, three conclusions emerge. The first is
that Gillet was drastically underpaid and is due some compensation for back
pay. The second is that there is a strong emotional argument that it would be
unjust to deprive him of his property, labour and means of production. The
third is that liberal contract law is (in this case) a barrier to justice. From
the standpoint of a legal realist, the correct thing to do in this case is
ignore the liberal contract law in favour of collectivist ideas regarding
property rights and labour, in order to uphold justice rather than some
meaningless rules of ideology. The judge wisely took this position. Once
again, it's very difficult to interpret a real conflict of values here, as the
just approach (as taken by the judge) is really quite apparent to the point of
being virtually inarguable. Any reasonable backer of liberal contract law (and
it should be clear that I am not one) would have to immediately concede that
this is a case that their ideological assumptions and resulting logical
deductions did not come to the right conclusion on, and should be acknowledged
as grounds for exception. I may enjoy using this case as a means to poke fun of
liberal capitalists with in the future, but it is obvious that no set of
assumptions is perfect.[2] The
conflict is consequently between justice and injustice, rather than between the
liberal and socialist conceptions of property and labour.
There is no
comparable moral issue present in Cobbe that would necessitate the
abandonment of liberalism in favour of socialism (at least for the purposes of
the case). There was an oral contract involving land that was broken; this
contract was not technically legal at the time it was broken. However, it is
useful conceptually if we pretend that it was as that would let the judges
choose between upholding the contract (proprietary estoppel) and awarding
damages as a consequence of breach of contract. While the case also centers
around the question of proprietary estoppel, whether the estoppel is granted or
not is a purely financial question that cannot be coherently placed within a
social context. Should the estoppel be granted, the "contract" is
merely "upheld"; should the estoppel not be granted, the other party
is "liable" for "breach of contract". These are all liberal
concepts. They all have to do with the self-interest of self-interested
parties. In the end, the judges opted for "breach of contract" rather
than estoppel, and while that may have perhaps had something to do with
perceived concepts of property rights, that doesn't place the ruling within a
social context, or lack of one, at all.
These are
two very different cases, then, that lack a sound social basis of comparison.
One discarded liberal contract law in favour of a just ruling, while the other
did not have the opportunity to contemplate such a thing and accordingly followed
liberal conventions.
LAWS 2202
Aug, 2012
http://dghjdfsghkrdghdgja.appspot.com/thoughts/essays/marxwasatory.html