Thursday, October 17, 2013

The future of Aboriginal Self-Governance: What to do with the Indian Act?

The future of Aboriginal Self-Governance:
What to do with the Indian Act?
November 6, 2012


            What I initially meant to be a sober and frank discussion of the future of the Indian Act has turned into a more subtle and complex project than was initially expected. First, it has required some research into the history of and motives behind the Indian Act, which has uncovered some surprising results. Second, it has necessarily intertwined heavily with the question of Indigenous self-governance, and what its nature shall be.

            It is perhaps more useful to pinpoint what will not be discussed in this paper. For sovereignty to be meaningful in the context of First Nations people, its nature must be determined outside of the framework of the Indian Act, which must only act as a formal means of delegating power within the hierarchy of Canadian Federalism. How that power is constructed, deployed and shared is a matter of sovereignty; it can only be determined at a local level by the nation itself, in consultation with the various federal and provincial powers. As each nation has its own traditions and concepts of what government and law are and how they should function, any kind of distributed structure would be inconsistent with the concept of self-governance itself. I will consequently not take any position or provide any suggestions as to how the various nations should organize themselves, other than to work under the assumption that each nation will determine its own desired method of communication with the federal government. Similarly, any laws or legal systems pushed down from above would simply not be consistent with self-governance and will not be discussed here in any manner; it is assumed that nations will fully organize themselves in whatever manner that they see fit. The sole exception to this rule would be in international law, where sovereign local governments would have a responsibility to work with the federal government to ensure that treaty obligations are met. This concern also extends to the Eurocentric concept of "aboriginal rights", which in truth seems to be little more than a linguistic gloss over of barely modified paternalistic and sometimes downright racist attitudes, often within the context of accelerated assimilation. Self-governance implies much more than being granted "rights of self-determination" over issues of extremely local jurisdiction while the same colonial powers continue to regulate nearly all aspects of existence.

            I began the exploration of this topic with a vague understanding of the Indian Act as an outdated, paternalistic piece of legislation that should be largely abolished and have ended it with a firm belief that it rather should (1) be modified to decentralize power out of the hands of Ottawa and into the hands of local nations and (2) be converted into a model for bilateral treaties between individual nations and the different branches of government, and then enshrined in a separate constitutional framework. A separate constitution for first nations that upholds the rights of self-determination would make it virtually impossible for the federal government to continue enacting arbitrary or oppressive legislation, solving the problematic issue of a meddling and paternalistic centralized government once and for all. As this is being written, the federal government is once again modifying the Indian Act without consulting First Nations. This must stop. It is only once both constitutions are placed on an equal level that the original promise of "travelling down the same river together"[1] can be spoken of once again.

The Purpose of the Indian Act

            Before we can understand what to do with the Indian Act, we need to understand what it is, why it was written and what its goals were. What we shall see is that all of these things have shifted over the years along with the views of the dominant European-descended majority, but that the government has maintained a roughly consistent desire to annihilate Aboriginal societies; what has changed have largely been the methods to accomplish this and views regarding the utility of assimilated Aboriginal peoples.

            The early Spanish explorers in the western hemisphere, whom were subjects of the powerful Hapsburg Family, which in the period in question always included the papal-crowned Holy Roman Emperor, were actually obligated by law to acknowledge a Papal edict called the Romanus Pontifex that demanded that "all Saracens and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ wheresoever" be reduced to "perpetual slavery".[2] While this later became the basis for the "Doctrine of Discovery", which is still the legal justification underlying the relevant American case law that allows for forced resettlement[3], it was not a significant factor in the European colonization of Canada. The first European settlers to Canada came from Bourbon France, which was never under the control of the Emperor; control eventually passed to England, which had long distanced itself from Catholic hegemony.
           
            The indigenous population had not yet been corrupted by the notion of private property, which allowed both the French and then the British to set up trading colonies with minimal (although not zero) conflict.[4] Nor was there any interest on behalf of either colonial power to ensure more than the safety of their trade routes.[5] Their primary concern in this matter was not even the indigenous population, but each other; as is well known, the French and English were at war with each other almost continually from 1066 until 1815. France's surrender to the British in Montreal in the year 1760 did not bring an end to French colonial interest in North America (that would have to wait until the end of the American Civil War, when a faster than expected Union victory forced the abandonment of an opportunistic plan to re-establish control of the continent west of the Mississippi by invading and militarizing Mexico), but it did bring an end to anything resembling the serious enforcement of French interests. More importantly, the peace treaty of 1763 resulted in an unchallenged British hegemony on the east coast of the continent. The royal proclamation of 1763 followed, primarily as a statement of that newfound hegemony.

            What the Crown's real motives were in restricting land sales to settlers will remain an open question to history, but a few things about the proclamation are certain. First, it was more than the formal transfer of captured French settlements and citizens to British rule but also a declaration of ownership of all land previously claimed by the French not as their own for personal use but as within an exclusive trade zone.[6] While the French may have stationed troops on the borders of their economic zone, and the result may have been protective for many indigenous peoples, what they were concerned about was keeping British settlers out of their trading zone, rather than owning the land. The kind of unilateral declaration of land ownership seen in the proclamation had not been previously encountered in Canada, but neither had the conditions or outcome of the French and Indian war. By the end of the war, only the Iroquois remained aligned with the British, and this alliance was mostly symbolic and quickly marginalized by the British as no longer useful; all other nations within the exclusive French economic zone were defeated, along with the French. This gave the war a previously unseen nature of conquest to it that makes the land grab understandable within a Eurocentric context.[7] Now, that the Iroquois sided with the British was largely a function of earlier contact with the French, the French having settlements closer to Iroquois home territory and the British functioning primarily as trading partners; similarly, most other nations sided with the French for the reason that they were in conflict with British settlers and engaged in trade with France, who protected them against those British settlers. The motive behind unilaterally taking away the rights of indigenous people to sell their own land may very well have been as simple as a view that they did not own the land at all, due to it being lost to conquest. There are other indications that the British considered the tribes conquered after 1760, such as a restriction on gift-giving, reference to the natives as "subjects", a restriction on the sales of arms and gunpowder and the building of forts against no other clear enemy besides themselves.[8] It should also be pointed out that the British already had a defined policy when it came to settler expansion into occupied lands, specifically that negotiating the formal sale of property before allowing settlement was an "expedient" way to avoid potentially successful hostile resistance.[9] Of specific concern were possible disruptions to the peltry trade.[10] As is typical of British imperial and foreign policy, the Royal Proclamation was in truth an elaborate ruse, itself the very cornerstone of the assimilation policy that followed; what it meant to say is that it is less dangerous for settler expansion and consequently better for harmonious trade relations when the natives are cleared out of the land before the settlers try and move in than it is for the settlers to move in by force, making it in truth a proclamation for the safety of British settlers[11] and, more importantly, their revenue. In fact, the direct result of the proclamation was a series of guerrilla-warfare like attacks on British forts, led by Seneca and Ottawa Chiefs, and with the hopes of inciting a French uprising against the British and the eventual return of French forces[12]; the mostly illiterate and disconnected chiefs could not have known that the Bourbons had sold them out for a steady stream of revenue from the sugar producing regions of the Caribbean, but they clearly realized that the aim of the proclamation was land expropriation.

            There is a second reason that the British adopted a policy of slow advancement after 1763 rather than one of conquest. It seems to be clear that, at least in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War, the British considered the tribes aligned with France to have been conquered along with the French communities themselves. This is a complex, subtle and difficult subject. On the one hand, the general view on the matter in the scholarly literature and in legal tradition (very strangely notwithstanding the relevant documents closest to 1763, which would be the most relevant) is that none of these First Nations were ever conquered. Yet, the policies and rulings produced by the crown and the court, along with the ability to use coercive violence as an effective means of enforcement, sure seem to suggest that this is the case. The answer to this apparent contradiction lies in the application of typical British pragmatism to a bit of a legal quandary. Until 1890, it was very firmly established Imperial precedent, from centuries old case law stretching back to the medieval British colonies in Ireland (that case law itself based on Roman approaches to military occupation) and upheld repeatedly since that time, that a nation that conquers another nation by force has a responsibility to uphold the laws of that nation, unless they are "Unchristian", until such a time has come that the conquered nation has adopted the norms of the conquering nation, at which point the laws of the dominant party may be enforced. On the other hand, it was also very established Imperial precedent that settlers moving on to unoccupied land remained subjects of the Crown and consequently remained bound by Imperial law, until such a time comes that an independent legislature is erected.[13] Therefore, if the British Crown wished to uphold its apparently clear view that the French-Aligned First Nations had been conquered, it would be required to uphold their laws - which included ideas like communal ownership of land, which at least one prominent British landholder of the period once referred to as "wicked",[14] in clear fear of its consequences for his own fortune.

            What the Crown wanted to do, in contradiction to its own Imperial laws, was treat North America as an unoccupied land, to be peopled by settlers. This would eliminate the need to recognize the aspects of indigenous culture that it found most disturbing and most threatening. Yet, of course, the area was peopled. So, how to get out of this mess? Well, should the Crown use force, it would be forced to recognize indigenous law; should it allow settler expansion, it would not be. When pressed on the issue, it would claim it had no control over the settlers. There was never an appeal of the Proclamation's unilateral declaration of ownership by means of conquest; in fact, it is still important precedent. So, that ultimately renders well over a hundred years of native legislation as unconstitutional under British law. Should this have been fought judicially, it would have almost certainly been declared ultra vires; however, that would have necessarily required that the first nations in question admit they had been conquered. Might it have been more beneficial to take this approach? Some rule of law, indeed.[15]

            The intent of this deconstruction is not to deny any beneficial consequences or legal protections that the proclamation has eventually resulted in for indigenous North Americans so much as it is to provide the necessary context in understanding the Indian Act, and perhaps to point out that the proclamation was neither properly understood by the angry British settlers that ignored it, nor by the Supreme Court of Canada in it's late twentieth century rulings, although there is a possibility that, in the latter case, this misunderstanding may have been intentional.

            It did not take long for this policy of slow, careful British expansion by the peaceful transfer of land through the construction of treaties to transform itself due to shifting realities on the ground; it took around ten years for the Crown to transfer it's ownership of the Indian territory back to the province of Quebec and less than fifteen years for the thirteen colonies to revolt, which resulted in a mass of migration both to the north and the west. This is of course where American history separates from Canadian history, and where the discussion will consequently leave relations between Americans and Native Americans behind, other than to say that the Americans favoured a more aggressive and violent approach to expansion than the British did.

            In Canada, the influx of loyalists after the revolutionary war - which included native peoples that saw the British as a lesser evil, most numerously the Iroquois - required that the crown find a place for them to settle, and the policy of slow, peaceful expansion was implemented to open up plots of land for that purpose. European immigration to Canada again increased dramatically after 1812, climaxing in the large Irish migration of 1830-1850. The Crown encouraged this migration to try and people the frontier for the purposes of creating a buffer that American settlers could not break past - much as existed in the Appalachians, when there were French soldiers stationed there. Due to all this immigration, and other factors such as disease, the aboriginal population was around 1% of the total population of the colonies of Canada at the time of confederation, which no longer made providing them with any kind of special treatment remotely important to British colonial interests; even by 1830, their numbers were so small relative to the Europeans that they were no longer useful as possible mercenaries and were transferred from military to civilian oversight, legally reduced to mere imperial subjects.[16] Throughout the period before confederation, the Crown experimented with two primary approaches in resettling tribes after purchasing their land. The first was a process of "civilizing" the tribes by settling them into agricultural or industrial based towns with the ultimate goal of assimilation, whereas the second was a process of removing the tribes to distant areas now known as "reservations". These approaches had their supporters and detractors, but shared the common goal of finding ways to reduce or eliminate the government's financial costs related to aboriginal peoples. Neither became official policy until 1847 when the government concluded that it could no longer "protect" indigenous interests in Ontario from white settlers, if it ever had any intention of doing so, and opened up native lands for fishing, hunting and squatting by Europeans, thereby officially deciding upon the method of assimilation in the east. The formal construction of reserves in Ontario followed in 1851. This was accompanied not just by the establishment of residential schools, but also by the creation of church-run manual labour camps, to "teach" the adult population how to perform hard labour. In 1857, the Crown further flexed it's perceived ownership of the old French economic zone by demanding that indigenous groups pay rent to access their traditional fishing grounds, and by renting out leases of these fishing grounds to non-aboriginal groups. While the government claimed that the aim of this was to more equitably redistribute resources away from the Indians, who were taking more than they needed, and towards the European-descended population, who did not previously have rights to access those areas for fishing despite the natives taking more than they needed, the legislation was in fact enacted in order to prevent indigenous people from growing prosperous through the sale of fish (to settlers) and was the direct result of a report that suggested that fishing may be a more suitable and lucrative vocation to the tribes of the area than farming, in an apparent challenge to assimilation polices; in other words, the report that pointed out that fishing could be used as a powerful enough tool of aboriginal economic development to provide for self-sufficiency managed to convince officials that encouraging non-aboriginal fisherman to fish in aboriginal lands would be an excellent way to raise revenue through taxation.[17] Another important development occurred in 1857, namely the Gradual Civilization Act that forced enfranchisement for "civilized" Indians. When put into the context of the Royal Proclamation and the rule against imposing laws on conquered peoples until they are properly anglicized, the proper framework for the next century of assimilation policies is understood: this horrendously unjust act was actually an attempt to re-establish the lapsed rule of imperial law. By the turn of the century, treaty rights were frequently denied altogether as inconsistent with common law.[18]

            Despite the influx of immigration, the government found it difficult to find immigrants willing to settle in the distant Prairie Provinces to people the border with the United States and prevent northward American expansion. The much warmer American Republic was simply more successful in marketing itself to would-be European immigrants. This was despite the passage of the homesteading act of 1872, which essentially gave away free land; there was serious concern that the west would be lost to the Americans. It started to become clear that the policy of slow settler expansion was not the correct approach to converting the vast tracts of land in the west into tax revenue; something else needed to be schemed up in order to increase the flow of funds to the Crown and to protect the land as a source of revenue. As the land was already peopled, it seemed strategic and cost-effective to convert those inhabitants into taxpayers and commodity producers.  So, due to slow settler population growth in the west, the policy of slow expansion finally evolved fully into a universal assimilation policy, which is more or less where the Indian Act remains today.

            We can now speak of the purpose of the Indian Act of 1876: it was to convert the indigenous peoples of Western Canada from nomadic hunter/gatherer/traders that produced essentially nothing that could be effectively taxed into food-producers for the export market, with the end goal to use the land effectively as a means of revenue generation. While that statement may seem shocking in the Canadian context, that shock is only as a result of our peculiar level of ignorance and naïveté regarding our history. Canada was and remains a colonial state. The purpose of colonialism has never been to steal land and oppress minorities, although this is often a consequence of it, but has always been to produce commodities for export to global markets for the purpose of generating revenue for the aristocracy. On the surface, things have changed over the centuries - aristocracy has been replaced by bourgeoisie, the fur trade has been replaced by energy, minerals, lumber and whatnot - but the general purpose of Canada as an exporting nation within a class-stratified, European-dominated world economy absolutely remains. The methods used to do this were forced education in the residential school system, forced Christianization, expropriation of land, a slow narrowing of the definition of "Indian" and forced enfranchisement with the aim of destroying tribal society.

            This policy of conversion to agriculture was partially instigated by an inability to attract white settlers. However, the indigenous population did not have a desire to convert to farming, leaving the Crown in a losing situation. This problem was eventually solved by specifically appealing to Scandinavian immigrants, who would be less adverse to the climate. As immigrants started pouring in at the turn of the century and concerns about the border largely dissipated, the desire for aboriginal farming communities lost its impetus. Attitudes towards aboriginal people also hardened; it became understood that if the natives would not choose to enter white society on their own then they would unfortunately have to be forced into it for their own good, or worse. Resentment also grew over the cost of supporting native communities who refused to enter white society. At first, the response of the government was to make the assimilation methods more violent, like an abusive parent harming an unruly child, but this (unsurprisingly) did not lead to the desired results. Feeling as though they had tried everything to force the Indian to conform, the government then largely convinced itself that the natives would not conform because they could not and that they never would. Land treaties were ignored and hunting and fishing rights, both commercial and subsistence, were denied to maximize tax revenue, with no interest in the severity of the consequences. The rise of eugenics in North America came shortly, which suggested and implemented even more ghastly approaches such as involuntary sterilization. By implementing forced sterilizations west of Manitoba, the remaining parts of Canada that still had functioning, sovereign indigenous populations adopted a position that was a signature away from genocide against them, which is certainly not very protective or paternalistic.

Postwar Developments

            A further shift in policy occurred after world war two. This shift was global, rather than local. It coincided with global European decolonization, as well as the abolition of racism as an acceptable form of thought in polite society. It also coincided with a rise in democratic socialism. These things culminated in movements for autonomy all over the world. In Canada, the first successes occurred in the 1970s. Today, the Supreme Court recognizes an inherent right to self-government and there were serious, but ultimately failed, discussions about constitutional amendments in the 1980s and 1990s that would have allowed for legitimate aboriginal self-governance. While some progress has been made at an academic level, the federal government retains exclusive control over all native lands. Victories for self-governance have been minimal, and rarely substantial. Further, the policy of assimilation has continued.

            A new Indian Act was passed in 1951 that had two substantial changes in it. The first is the inclusion of s. 88, which brings all Indians under the jurisdiction of general provincial and federal legislation. The second was forced enfranchisement for women that married enfranchised men; after years of legal battles, this was modified (and arguably worsened) in 1985 by bill c-31, which both restored status to many people who had been denied it and constructed a two-generation blood quantum rule that some observers have argued will lead to total assimilation within only a few generations. In reality, this is unlikely: more likely is that it will lead to social conflict within a few generations. The legislation is simply another piece in a long line of racist, assimilative policies that assume perceived inferiority - if Indians are forced or encouraged to better themselves, they will no longer wish to be Indians anymore. In fact, recent genetic studies have backed up a number of folk tales that described Europeans escaping the regimentation and fundamentalism of the colonies to live in freedom with aboriginal peoples; the reality is that most tribes in the Eastern half of the continent are majority European-descended in their male lineages[19] (also see attached figures), which suggests that these folk tales must have actually been describing a very substantial movement of people from the colonies to the tribes. There are also legitimate historical records of widespread intermarriage before the Royal Proclamation. So, the idea that marrying out will slowly annihilate aboriginal culture seems to be fantastical; inter-marriage has been occurring for centuries and it has yet to destroy aboriginal identity. Not only will aboriginal peoples continue to desire living their traditional lifestyles, but their traditional lifestyles will continue to attract non-aboriginal people through marriage and other bonds. Aboriginal identity is truly cultural, not genetic. The government has merely set itself up for a confrontation.

            When Pierre Trudeau gained power in 1968, he took a characteristically blunt approach to the issue. Rather than continue with all of the same kind of corruptions in the spirit of the law and sneaky social engineering experiments, he had Jean Chretien table a white paper that outlined the government's centuries old end goal without any hubris. The white paper suggested many things; a few of them were to repeal the Indian Act, transfer land directly to council ownership, increase aid and establish aboriginal citizens of Canada as equal under the law - for better or for worse. It was the last of these suggestions that caused a large backlash in the Aboriginal community. The plan was officially withdrawn, but as it was really little more than a candid statement of deeply entrenched policy with a slightly more liberal than normal spin, the government quickly went back to its sneaky social engineering experiments once Trudeau was finally pushed out of office fifteen years later by a concerned Ronald Reagan, due to differences in philosophy regarding national defence strategies; Mulroney had already brought in Bill C-31 before anybody could get through When Irish Eyes Are Smiling. Trudeau, however, left a very deep legacy on the question of aboriginal self-government, by constructing the Canada Act, 1982, which both entrenched aboriginal rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and entrenched treaty rights through s. 35(1). While s. 35(1) has yet to be tested fully in court, early rulings have suggested that it may "not be worth the paper it's written on", as Trudeau once famously claimed of the treaties themselves - the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated through the Sparrow Test that it would only uphold treaty rights against legislation if the legislation does not have a "valid legislative objective"[20], which would rarely protect treaty rights from legislation of a general nature, which would apply to aboriginals under s. 88 of the Indian Act. Further provincial restrictions on fishing and hunting, for example, would continue to exhaust treaty rights, so long as they are worded in such a manner that the court can interpret as having a "valid objective". Some have interpreted R v. Sparrow as a step forward, but it still places treaty rights at the mercy of the legislature and subject to the interpretation of a judge, which fails to recognize the treaties as contracts between sovereign peoples.

            After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord (due to a dissenting aboriginal voice that claimed he'd been shut out from negotiation), the talks were started again under a new name, the Charlottetown Accord, and modified to ensure that aboriginal groups had a place at the table. What resulted was rather disappointing: essentially an entrenchment of the existing assimilation policies, under the exact system of hierarchy that already existed. The municipal model of the Advancement Act[21] would become a "third level of government", ordered below both the federal and provincial level and subject to the same hierarchy, making it more like an incorporation process than a statement of sovereignty.  Aboriginal peoples could create their own bylaws, but would still be subject to federal and provincial legislation under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act and s. 88 of the Indian Act. It used a lot of very nice language but it did not provide for a path to meaningful autonomy and suggested essentially no substantive change; in fact, it would have further entrenched the idea of the government owing a fiduciary duty to its inferior aboriginal citizens. In the end, most Aboriginal groups rejected the accord as insufficient. The next important initiative was the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People's Report, which, at 4000 pages, was likely read by few; a substantial part of the report was composed of a history of the Canadian government's relationship with aboriginal peoples, and while it was formally apologetic in rescinding a number of anachronisms that no longer served the interest of the state and even instructive on providing for financial compensation, that section seemed more to act as an explanation of the continuing assimilative policies that the report suggested. If anything, it was the most comprehensive attempt at assimilation yet, going so far as to create an aboriginal parliament based on the Westminster system. First, it denied the right of secession, which, while on nobody's minds, would necessarily be a right of sovereignty. Second, it proposed a complicated system of restrictions on aboriginal by-laws. Two zones of influence would be acknowledged: the core and the periphery. Aboriginals would be allowed to legislate in matters related to their core areas of concern, but not their peripheral ones, or at least not without an arrangement worked out with both the federal and provincial governments. Specifically, the report seems to be concerned about Aboriginal laws affecting non-aboriginal peoples. In what way does asking permission to enact laws reflect a shift to sovereignty?  In what way could a sovereign nation enact laws that would not affect surrounding communities? Would hunting and fishing laws not affect the outside community if there are migratory animals involved? Further, the report upheld the Sparrow Test, explicitly stating that the provincial legislature would have precedence over Aboriginal legislation so long as that provincial legislation forms a valid legislative objective. So, it seems rather clear that the court would quickly restrict aboriginal law-making abilities entirely to concerns that the state has no interest in, while retaining ultimate authority on issues it has an interest in. That's a so-called path to sovereignty that would likely end in further accusations of false promises. There were also a number of suggestions involving education and healthcare that aboriginals would be wise to be wary about, given their racial character. Legislation of this nature should be enacted locally, not by a federal government with a history of institutionalized racism. The economic recommendations likewise continued on with the centuries-old push towards agriculture, while adding a few new things into the mix: the suggestion that minerals and other resources mined from aboriginal lands should prioritize the use of aboriginal labour, the creation of an aboriginal bank and programs set up to encourage entrepreneurialism.[22]

A New Model
           
            There was, however, an agreement reached at the turn of the century that could act as worthwhile model for indigenous sovereignty moving forwards, namely the Nisga'a agreement. While the agreement shares some fundamentals with both the Charlottetown Accord and the Royal Commission, it takes a very large step forward in the recognition of sovereignty in a way that is very sensitive to indigenous concerns.

            The Nisga'a is a nation of four tribes on the Nass River in British Columbia that never surrendered their sovereignty in any remote way. The treaty is worthwhile on a number of levels. First, it transfers ownership of the land to the Nisga'a people as a whole, rather than to individuals. This is very much an acceptable development because it (finally) accepts traditional concepts of land ownership. While the Nisga'a can sell any of the land in fee simple to any individual, the land will remain owned by the Nisga'a; while this may seem paradoxical, recognize that the ultimate owner of all ceded territory in Canada is, in fact, parliament - which gives it authority to levy taxes. The Nisga'a also have the right to escheat, that is recover any land that is left to no heir. These are sovereign land rights. Second, the agreement allows the Nisga'a hunting and fishing rights in a large area around the land they now own, subject to quotas, as well as to have a role to play in the management of these areas. This again mimics traditional land use agreements, where separate nations and tribes would share hunting and fishing grounds; should Europeans have arrived in North America with a similar culture to the indigenous population, what this represents is a reasonable assumption as to how the arrangement would have evolved over time along with increases in technology and knowledge about resource management. Third, it has allowed for the creation of a political system that closely mirrors their existing society, institutions and tribal composition, rather than force something anglo-centric down from above. While the agreement does not provide for full sovereignty, it does provide for almost total control (relative to reasonable restrictions, such as resource management laws and the observance of the Charter) over concerns relating to the Nation's way of life and its perception of its own identity. [23]

            In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada established a duty to consult aboriginals before enacting legislation that may affect them.[24] This ruling constructed a process to acknowledge the right to self-determination, based on s. 35. However, the Conservative government that took power in 2006 and won a majority in 2010, and which is ideologically opposed to "judicial activism", has completely ignored this ruling, setting up a potential battle between the two branches. In completing ignoring the ruling, the government may be relying on the ability to stack the Court with like-minded people in the near future. This could have deep consequences for the establishment of multiple precedents regarding s. 35 rights, including further development of the ruling in R v. Sparrow.

The Return of Liberalism

            While it may seem as though the Nisga'a agreement and duty to consult provide a positive, working model forward, in reality the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, as insufficient as it was, may have actually signalled the closing of a window for aboriginals that have already signed treaties that may remain closed for some time. The current government has no interest in consulting with aboriginals before it legislates on their behalf. Furthermore, we appear to be in the process of yet another shift in policy: turning back to assimilation along with the shift back to full-scale liberalism; this would actually be necessary in order for government to conform to the prevailing economic dogma. Wealth redistribution back to exploited peoples is not remotely consistent with neo-liberalism, nor could the current reserve system withstand the full onslaught of austerity and individual property rights. While most ordinary Canadians remain perplexed at the lack of quality schooling and healthcare available to First Nations people, they fail to realize that the current economic paradigm of the ruling class demands the elimination of all public services altogether, in favour of markets. While it is always healthy to stay positive, it is equally healthy to remain realistic; if current trends in economic thought continue as they have been, the future for indigenous people in Canada is excessively bleak. It calls for the full-scale expropriation of what remains of their land for the purposes of unending economic growth and the generation of ever increasing revenue streams, with catastrophic environmental consequences and the absolute minimum amount of compensation that shareholders are forced to part with by court order. While neo-liberalism was slow to take hold in Canada, it now has a firm grip on the nation's governance. As of the time of this writing, the government is in the process of a large overhaul of aboriginal legislation designed to accelerate the further assimilation of First Nations peoples. No attempt has been made to consult them. Leading Aboriginal Scholar Pamela Palmater summarized the situation on her blog as follows:

FNPOA, together with other bills in process: Bill C-428 impacting by-laws, estates & education, Bill S-6 re elections, Bill S-2 re matrimonial real property, Bill C-27 re First Nation accountability, Bill S-8 re First Nation water, and the First Nation Education Act to come essentially change the entire legal and political landscape for First Nations - unilaterally and against our collective will.[25]

Bills S-6, S-8 and C-27 centralize control back in the minister's office, a clear step backwards for self-governance, while perpetuating negative stereotypes about aboriginals for consumption by the government's voting base; it is has been hypothesized that the motive is to create a justification to cut spending,[26] which is likely a vengeful reaction, that being characteristic of Stephen Harper, to alarming coverage about the living conditions of aboriginals last year, which has affected him negatively in opinion polls.[27] Bill S-2, while seemingly produced for the benefit of aboriginal women, has been interpreted by at least one independent female aboriginal commentator as a sneaky way to reform property laws.[28] Neither the First Nations Property Ownership Act (FNPOA) nor the First Nation Education Act have been tabled as of the time of this writing, but both are causing great alarm in the aboriginal community. The focus of the other legislation seems to be on centralization; when this is considered in the context of the residential school system, it is alarming that not consulting would even be contemplated. As for the FNPOA, there are concerns that it may look like the 1969 White Paper.[29] The government is also modifying the process of making changes to land designation in order to make it easier for corporations to gain access to reserve lands.[30]

            The opposition Liberals have joined in, too, calling for a committee to discuss ways to abolish the Indian Act.[31]

Conclusions

            As can be seen, then, neither the British nor Canadian governments ever held a static "Indian Policy" with a single, defined goal. Rather, policy has shifted wildly to whatever was seen as most economically beneficial to the British and Canadian ruling class, from assimilation as full citizens to extermination through sterilization. Within this operating principle of unrestricted pragmatism, native rights were never meaningful abstractions, but merely empty promises designed to minimize dissent, which is bothersome for tax revenue and can be very expensive to put down, as well as to trick the Indians into co-operating with plans for their own demise. This remains true today. It is clear, then, that if the goal is to ensure that aboriginal rights are legitimately protected, and that aboriginal peoples are to have the freedom to live as they desire, we need to get legislative power out of the hands of the federal government and into the hands of the nations themselves and that this needs to be regulated by a document that is enforced by the courts and that neither industrial nor class interests have any ability to arbitrarily modify. If the goal is also full sovereignty, then this constitution must be as minimal as possible, in favour of more detailed frameworks at local levels.

Suggestions

            There is a tendency in the literature to approach the problem of aboriginal self-governance as a process of constructing a list of rights that aboriginals shall have. For example, Slattery[32] compiles an inexhaustive list of six "generic rights" that simultaneously includes the right to honourable treatment by the Crown and the right to self-government itself. Now, who grants these rights? What of rights that are not listed? Will the Crown continue to act oppressively in areas where rights aren't explicitly listed? In truth, this is but another paternal approach, intentional or not, and should be immediately abandoned. Sovereignty is not, and cannot be obtained through, a process of being granted rights by one's sovereign; she who is granted rights by a sovereign is necessarily not sovereign. As painful as it may be to admit this is an unworkable dead end, all work on this topic should be buried or burned and forgotten - this can be nothing more than a plan for further disaster.

            However, any kind of aboriginal self-governance is going to culminate in the construction of something approaching a state, no matter how decentralized and participatory that state is. This necessarily requires the construction of a constitution and a bill of rights. Is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms sufficient? Many academic texts, especially those written by non-aboriginal people, seem to consider the question a non-issue; obviously, any aboriginal government would be bound by the charter. That it would not be is simply inconceivable. However, this is not widely assumed on the ground, outside of ivory towers, where there is actually a wide divergence of opinion.[33] The Charter remains the white man's law, after all, and may plausibly do a poor job in upholding the rights of Aboriginal as the Aboriginals themselves see those rights. Our courts have a mixed record on upholding aboriginal rights, anyways; there is valid reason for distrust in such a document, even if its contents could be normalized. That brings up another difficult question: what aspects of Aboriginal society itself require checks and balances to prevent Aboriginals from oppressing Aboriginals, or Aboriginals from oppressing non-Aboriginals? Who figures this out? Will Aboriginals consent, or feel these are simply further paternalistic restrictions?

            There are at least some Aboriginal voices that are adamant about Charter protection.[34] There are others that reject it as insensitive to aboriginal concerns and still others that reject it on principle alone.[35] For the purposes of my proposals, however, the question is actually rather irrelevant. I would propose that an aboriginal constitution exist side-by-side with ours, which would be outside of the Charter's jurisdiction.  A better question to ask is "what should an aboriginal charter look like?", and to answer that I think we need to consult with aboriginal groups, but for the purposes of this report we can use the shortcut of looking at existing aboriginal rights legislation, as produced by aboriginals. In truth, there are minor differences between the Inuit act and the Charter;[36] one is clearly based on the other. Issues of bitterness and sovereignty aside, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms remains one of the most detailed and comprehensive charters in the world. The indigenous populations of Canada could do much worse - for example, a bill of rights ratified way back in 1791. However, as each nation is independent of the others, they would each have their own bill of rights. I would expect that most nations would choose to start with the Charter as a base, and then add or delete as desired to reflect their culture. This may include things like modifying the language rights and adding rights to belong to the community, rights to food, rights to shelter and other amendments that are more in line with traditional ways of life and would make leftists rather giddy.

            I would suggest that a body similar to the Assembly of First Nations, if not the assembly itself, form at a higher level of government, for the purposes of administration. As they'll be writing their own constitution, they can figure the rest out themselves. They may or may not want to implement a universal charter, some kind of equalization program, taxation, rules of entrance, co-ordinated resource protection strategies, universities, health care, a parliament or even simple statements of values. They may, on the other hand, just want a minarchist framework. Yet, I strongly recommend that a framework exists, as it is likely the only plausible way to build a workable infrastructure in a globalized economy.

            That leaves us with two separate confederations - the Assembly of First Nations and the Confederation of Canada. The next step would be in forming a larger agreement that binds together these two confederations, a recognition of the two row wampum treaty converted into modern legalese. This agreement would lay out rules that each of the two confederations must follow in order for them to live in harmony on the same land. It should not yield any political or legislative authority, but it should be binding on its two (or three, if quebec would prefer this approach) members. It should also be open to further membership should other groups, like the Inuit or Metis, decide they would prefer this approach.

            In the mean time the Metis would exist in a gray area. If the First Nations wish to reject them from their confederation, I feel they have every right to do so. Yet, they ought to remain Canadian citizens, and protected under s. 25 and s. 35 of the charter. I would consequently not recommend removing these sections of the charter, as they would still apply to Metis, as well as to non-status Indians and status Indians operating in Canadian jurisdiction.  However, if First Nations continue to reject the Metis, and they feel Canadian Citizenship is not enough, then serious discussion should be had about bringing them in on the level of a confederation, organized along similar principles. Anybody could choose to hold multiple citizenships (I have European, Ottawa and Cree ancestry, myself) if they choose to and they meet the requirements constructed by the individual nations. A generalized "First Nations citizenship" may also be useful in determining access to services.

            I would further propose that it is not necessary for any single aboriginal nation or tribe to join confederation at all, if they choose not to. In fact, I think there should be clear standards put in place that act as a restriction upon membership. One rule I would propose as fundamental is that a nation wishing to join confederation needs to have already constructed a bill of rights, and that there needs to be a few things within it - equality rights, most importantly, but the elimination of blood quantum rules nearly so. Nor would joining confederation merely be a formality; access to certain programs would be conditional upon admittance, as those programs would exist in the framework of the Assembly. That would not rule out the possibility of coming to agreements about programs through bilateral agreements. Confederation should retain the right to suspend membership and place trade sanctions on any nation that does not uphold the common principles that had been agreed upon. These restrictions and sanctions would not be meant to act as a barrier to entrance, so much as they would be meant to ensure that certain rights that confederation considers to be paramount are respected by all of its members.

            If these suggestions are adopted then the formal hierarchical control of Canada over its aboriginal peoples would be immediately abolished, and any rights it has to assert itself would be immediately exhausted. Hundreds of pieces of legislation would immediately become obsolete and should, for the sake of friendship, be immediately repealed. Also repealed should be section 91(24) of the constitution act, as well as the Indian Act itself. However, the Indian Act should only be repealed on a nation-by-nation basis and on the condition that a replacement agreement is worked out between the nation and the federal and relevant provincial governments. While these agreements would be bilateral, they should be placed within the framework of the agreement between confederations. Each nation would determine its own preferred modifications, including its preferred definition of itself; constructing a general definition of an "Indian" would no longer be meaningful, not even at the level of the Assembly. However, should it be felt that this is a desirable declaration, I would encourage the Assembly to apply the most generous definition possible to encourage greater integration not just with Canada but with the world and conform to international standards of citizenship. This is an issue of culture, not of race. In general, both marriage and childbirth imply citizenship, regardless of the other details. Maximizing variation is healthy for all populations.

            Transfer of property from the crown to First Nations should occur bilaterally, but should in general follow the provisions of the Nisga'a agreement, which place the ownership of the land in the hands of every member of the community, do not allow radical title to leave the ownership of the community and allow for shared, external hunting grounds wherever this remains possible.[37] Once the transfer is complete, each nation will retain absolute sovereignty over what it wishes to do with its land. It may or may not sell plots in fee simple and may or may not decide to allow "sale" to outsiders, but this sale of land would conform to the rules of the Nisga'a agreement, meaning the land would ultimately stay within the control of the community. Should any nation refuse to take ownership of their own land, and have no alternate solution that is not the status quo, the Crown would reserve the right to unilaterally exit any existing treaty and sell the reserve land at its own pleasure, so long as it gives other First Nations a first opportunity to purchase and puts in place the proper provisions to relocate the citizens to social housing in a metropolitan area. This, again, is not a threat that the Crown should have any intention of following through with, but a statement that it is no longer interested in administering aboriginal lands for them and in fact a choice between taking on the responsibilities of sovereignty and forfeiting a separate identity; if a nation, once given the opportunity to do so, will not take control of its own affairs in order to define itself, its claim to being sovereign becomes dubious at best and the Crown is left with no option but to take drastic options to end the current hopeless and unsustainable arrangement.

            The laws of Canada and the provinces of Canada would in general not apply in First Nations jurisdictions, nor would the reverse situation be true. While some may correctly argue that this would be an administrative nightmare, it is a necessary consequence of sovereignty. That being said, harmonization should be encouraged and discussed for the purposes of brevity. Wherever crime is committed, jurisdiction would fall to the area that the crime is committed; an aboriginal offender in Canadian territory would be subject to Canadian laws, whereas a Canadian offender in aboriginal territory would be subject to aboriginal laws. Bilateral transfer agreements may be arranged, if there is a desire to do so. While formal customs procedures should be minimized, Canada would retain the right to ban repeat offenders from its soil. Transfer agreements are inevitable. There are interesting economic opportunities involved with this, as well. For example, an aboriginal community would have every right to choose not to legislate on the topic of marijuana. However, an increase in formal government-to-government relations should probably minimize the problem of contraband.
           
            There simply isn't anywhere to place an authoritative minister of aboriginal affairs in this framework. However, both the federal and provincial governments should maintain departments that are in charge of aboriginal affairs, for the purposes of maintaining good relations through bilateral agreements.

            Taxation should be a part of the bilateral treaty negotiations, as a contribution for services. Certainly, there would be no reason to pay taxes unless there were services rendered. Taxation arrangements between First Nations and the Assembly should be determined internally. As for the issue of voting rights, western concepts of government connect taxation very heavily with representation; traditional societies may not have had taxation (or currency), but they did generally uphold the idea of communal responsibility and reciprocal sharing. The logical conclusion of reciprocal sharing in a monetized economy is progressive taxation. Yet, it may not make sense in an aboriginal context to connect that to representation. Voting rights would rather need to be connected to situations where there is a direct concern involved, and that may not be easy to legislate or understand. Within this framework, in order for the decisions made by the Canadian parliament to directly affect an aboriginal person, that aboriginal person would have to have Canadian citizenship - perhaps they own property or work off of the reserve. Yet, if an outside government is to exploit a resource in the vicinity of a reserve, then, in the spirit of respect and friendship, there should be some discussion about the matter, eventually culminating in a bilateral agreement. This may involve a referendum, but it would be inside of the reserve. Voting rights for the Canadian parliament should consequently not be assumed for aboriginals, but granted on a citizenship basis. In practice, that would lead to most aboriginals having voting rights. Conversely, non-Aboriginals living on reserves should have some say in decisions that affect them, but this may take the form of consultation and petitioning rather than the form of a vote. As nations are sovereign, this is an internal decision. However, I would strongly suggest citizenship based voting rights as well, in co-ordination with generous concepts about citizenship. Note that the effects of all of this land transfer would necessitate a complete redrawing of the riding system, as large portions of the country would leave both Federal and Provincial jurisdiction.

            These recommendations have been based on a cursory but careful study of the literature, including the recommendations made in the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the content of the novel Nisga'a agreement, perspectives on First Nations cultural concerns and a historical analysis of the relationship between Canada and First Nations peoples that is ultimately rooted in critical race theory. It seeks to balance the concerns of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people by creating self-governance and minimizing fiduciary dependence. Due to the nature and purpose of this report, the recommendations are vague; however, I hope the general framework of two separate confederations is well received. I have concluded that such a framework is necessary to ensure that Aboriginal rights are upheld; the historical record of legislation and jurisprudence, combined with the direction taken by the current elected government and the Supreme Court's developing precedent regarding s. 35, clearly demonstrate that Aboriginal people cannot rely on the Canadian government or the Canadian people for fair or equitable treatment. The only way forward is to eliminate legislative authority. If nothing else is taken from this, please do not overlook this deduction.

Figures
Figure 1: Map of Indo-European Haplotype markers for Indigenous populations, demonstrating that most Indigenous populations in Canada are, in fact, overwhelmingly Metis. European genes amongst far northern aboriginals can be explained via the Hudson's Bay Company. The Indo-European marker in Asian Indian populations is not due to European contact, but due to an ancient invasion described in the Vedas. Y-DNA measures patrilineal descent only; this suggests that high numbers of indigenous peoples in Eastern Canada can trace their direct male lineage back to European settlers. It also graphically demonstrates the differing policies of English/French and Spanish/Portugese Colonialism. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Haplogroup_R_(Y-DNA).PNG, Creative Commons)



Figure 2: Map of North Asian Haplotype markers for Indigenous populations, demonstrating a late migration over the Bering Strait and genetic similarity with Siberian populations. Note that this corresponds almost exactly to the distribution of the Na-Dene language group, which is now accepted as a branch of the Siberian Yeniseian language group. This is overwhelming evidence for common descent. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haplogroup_C3_(Y-DNA), Creative Commons)


Figure 3: Map of Haplotype markers for populations indigenous to the Americas, demonstrating an early migration over the Bering Strait and genetic similarity with Altaic populations. Note the decreased, minority prevalence of the indigenous haplotype in the areas of early contact. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haplogroup_Q_(Y-DNA), Creative Commons)


Figure 4: Map of group O bloodtypes amongst indigenous populations, indicating influence from European and perhaps African populations in the areas of first contact. This map also graphically depicts population movements due to the Indian Removal Act, and the event known as the "trail of tears". (Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Mapa_del_grupo_O.GIF, Creative Commons)



Figure 5: Proposed governing relationships.


Tables

Table I: Y chromosome frequency in select aboriginal populations.

Group
Language
Place
n
C3
Q
R1
Others
Reference
48
6
31
62.5
0
Bortoloni 2003[4]
Eastern North America
97
4.1
15.5
50.5
29.9
Bolnick 2006[1]
Central North America
44
11
25
50
14
Zegura 2004[2]
25
8
36
44
12
Zegura 2004[2]
15
33
27
40
0
Malhi 2008[3]
Northeast North America
155
7.7
33.5
38.1
20.6
Bolnick 2006[1]
62
1.6
50.0
37.1
11.3
Bolnick 2006[1]
--
398
9.0
58.1
22.2
10.7
Hammer 2005[5]
19
0
69
21
10
Bortoloni 2003[4]
Western North America
243
11.5
70.4
18.1
--
Malhi 2008[3]
44
16
61
16
7
Zegura 2004[2]
71
0
  87.3  
12.7
0
Zegura 2004[2]
--
530
6.0
77.2
12.5
4.3
Zegura 2004[2]
60
0
80.0
11.7
8.3
Zegura 2004[2]
36
2.8
75.0
11.1
11.1
Bolnick 2006[1]
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Y-DNA_haplogroups_in_Indigenous_peoples_of_the_Americas, Creative Commons)

(Note: I have come across references to other groups as well that are as high or higher: Seminoles at 50% R1 and Ojibwe at a startling 79%. However, I haven't prioritized the time to verifying sources.)




JURISPRUDENCE

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73

R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075


SECONDARY MATERIAL

Badcock, William T. Who Owns Canada: Aboriginal Title and Canadian Courts, (Ottawa: Canadian Association in Support of the Native Peoples, 1976)

Barsh, Russell Lawrence. "Indigenous Rights and the Lex Loci in British Imperial Law" in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing Aboriginal Land Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich, 2004)

Blair, Peggy J. Lament For a First Nation, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008)

Daugherty, Wayne & Madill, Dennis. Indian Government under Indian Act egislation. (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980)

King George III, Royal Proclamation, online: Royal Proclamation, 1763
< http://www.specific-claims-law.com/specific-claims-background/12-royal-proclamation-1763>

Madison, James. "The Federalist no. 10" in James Madison, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, eds, The Federalist Papers, online: The Federalist no. 10 <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm>

Magnet, Joseph Eliot. "Who are the Aboriginal People of Canada?" in Joseph Eliot Magnet & Dwight A. Dorey, eds, Aboriginal Rights Litigation (Markham: LexisNexis, 2003)

McConnell, Michael N. A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1992)

Nahanee, Teressa. "Speaking Notes to the Canadian Bar Association" in Canadian Bar Association, ed, Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal Self Government (?: Canadian Bar Association, 1992)

Palmater, Pamela. Flanagan National Petroleum Ownership Act: Stop Big Oil Land Grab (August 7 2012), online: Indigenous Nationhood <http://www.indigenousnationhood.blogspot.ca/2012/08/flanagan-national-petroleum-ownership.html>

Palmater, Pamela. "Bill S-2 - Family Home on Reserves: Protection or threat?", Rabble (October 3, 2011) online: Rabble.ca < http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/pamela-palmater/2011/10/bill-s-2-family-homes-reserves-protection-or-threat>

Pope Nicholas V. Romanus Pontifex, online: The Bull Romanus Pontifex (Nicholas V), January 8, 1455. < http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/indig-romanus-pontifex.html>

Rafoss, Bill. "First Nations and The Charter of Rights" in John D. Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008), p. 198-205

Scott, Tracie Lea. Postcolonial Sovereignty? The Nisga'a Final Agreement (Saskatoon: Purich, 2012)

Singh, Ripan (2008). "Distribution of Y Chromosomes Among Native North Americans: A Study of Athapaskan Population History". American Journal of Physical Anthropology.
< http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/022/10143.pdf>

Slattery, Brian. "The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" in John D. Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008), p. 24

The Institute on Governance . Summary of the Final Report of The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, (Ottawa: The Institute on Governance, 1997)

Two Row Wampum Treaty, 1613, online: Wampum <http://www.ganondagan.org/wampum.html>

Vongdouangchanh, Bea. "Feds say Bill C-27 will bring accountability to First Nations, but critics call it paternalistic, redundant", The Hill Times (October 15, 2012) online: The Hill Times <http://www.hilltimes.com/news/legislation/2012/10/15/feds-say-bill-c-27-will-bring-accountability-to-first-nations-but-critics/32437>

Vowel, Chelsea. "First Nations Property Ownership Act Just White Paper Lite" Rabble (August 23, 2012) online: Rabble.ca < http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/apihtawikosisan/2012/08/first-nations-property-ownership-act-just-white-paper-lite >

"Frequently Asked Questions - Amendments to the Land Designation Sections of the Indian Act", Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (August 19, 2012) online: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1350676320034/1350676521625>

"Liberal Leader Bob Rae Launches Debate on His Private Members Motion to Replace the Indian Act", Liberal Party of Canada (October 22, 2012) online: Liberal.ca <http://www.liberal.ca/newsroom/news-release/liberal-leader-bob-rae-launches-debate-on-his-private-members-motion-to-replace-the-indian-act/>

"Rae calls Attawapiskat 'our Third World'", Canadian Press (Dec 17, 2011) online: CBC News Online <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/12/17/attawapiskat-bob-rae-visit.html>





FIGURES & TABLES

"Genetic History of Indigenous Peoples of The Americas", Wikipedia online: Wikipedia.org,  <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_history_of_indigenous_peoples_of_the_Americas>

TEXTS NOT CITED

Bear, Leroy Little. "Aboriginal Paradigms: Implications for Relationships to Land and Treaty Making" in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing Aboriginal Land Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich, 2004)

Bartlett, Richard H. Indians & Taxation in Canada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1992)

Borrows, John. Drawing Out Law: A Spirit's Guide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010)

Indian Act, RSC. 1985, c. I-5

Indian and Northern Affairs. First Nations Governance Handbook (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs, 2003)

Kennedy, Dawnis. "Reconciliation without Respect? Section 35 and Indigenous Legal Orders" in Law Commission of Canada, ed, Indigenous Legal Traditions (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007)

Leslie, John & Maguire, Ron. The Historical Development of The Indian Act. (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs,1978)

Ross, Rupert. Dancing With a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality (Markham: Reed Books Canada, 2010)

Wesley-Esquimaux, Cynthia C.. "Negotiating Future Arrangements: Identifying Issues for Negotiation" in Canadian Bar Association, ed, Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal Self Government (?: Canadian Bar Association, 1992)




[1] Two Row Wampum Treaty, 1613, online: Wampum <http://www.ganondagan.org/wampum.html>
[2] Pope Nicholas V, Romanus Pontifex, online: The Bull Romanus Pontifex (Nicholas V), January 8, 1455.
< http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/indig-romanus-pontifex.html>
[3] William T. Badcock, Who Owns Canada: Aboriginal Title and Canadian Courts, (Ottawa: Canadian Association in Support of the Native Peoples, 1976) p. 9-14
[4] ibid., p. 4
[5] ibid., p. 5
[6] King George III, Royal Proclamation, online: Royal Proclamation, 1763
< http://www.specific-claims-law.com/specific-claims-background/12-royal-proclamation-1763>
[7] William T. Badcock, Who Owns Canada: Aboriginal Title and Canadian Courts, (Ottawa: Canadian Association in Support of the Native Peoples, 1976) p. 9
[8] Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1992), p 162-172
[9] William T. Badcock, Who Owns Canada: Aboriginal Title and Canadian Courts, (Ottawa: Canadian Association in Support of the Native Peoples, 1976) p. 5
[10] Joseph Eliot Magnet, "Who are the Aboriginal People of Canada?" in Joseph Eliot Magnet & Dwight A. Dorey, eds, Aboriginal Rights Litigation (Markham: LexisNexis, 2003), p. 38
[11] William T. Badcock, Who Owns Canada: Aboriginal Title and Canadian Courts, (Ottawa: Canadian Association in Support of the Native Peoples, 1976) p. 9
[12] Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1992), p 172-195
[13] Russell Lawrence Barsh, "Indigenous Rights and the Lex Loci in British Imperial Law" in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing Aboriginal Land Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich, 2004), p. 94-112
[14] James Madison, "The Federalist no. 10" in James Madison, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, eds, The Federalist Papers, online: The Federalist no. 10 <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm>
[15] Russell Lawrence Barsh, "Indigenous Rights and the Lex Loci in British Imperial Law" in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing Aboriginal Land Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich, 2004), p. 94-112
[16] Joseph Eliot Magnet, "Who are the Aboriginal People of Canada?" in Joseph Eliot Magnet & Dwight A. Dorey, eds, Aboriginal Rights Litigation (Markham: LexisNexis, 2003), p. 37-40
[17] Peggy J. Blair, Lament For a First Nation, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), p. 37-61
[18] ibid., p. 83
[19] Singh, Ripan (2008). "Distribution of Y Chromosomes Among Native North Americans: A Study of Athapaskan Population History". American Journal of Physical Anthropology. < http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/022/10143.pdf>, p 419-420
[20] R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075
[21] Wayne Daugherty & Dennis Madill. Indian Government under Indian Act egislation. (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980), p. 29

[22] The Institute on Governance. Summary of the Final Report of The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, (Ottawa: The Institute on Governance, 1997)
[23] Tracie Lea Scott, Postcolonial Sovereignty? The Nisga'a Final Agreement (Saskatoon: Purich, 2012), p. 56-115
[24] Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73
[25] Pamela Palmater, Flanagan National Petroleum Ownership Act: Stop Big Oil Land Grab (August 7 2012), online: Indigenous Nationhood <http://www.indigenousnationhood.blogspot.ca/2012/08/flanagan-national-petroleum-ownership.html>
[26] Bea Vongdouangchanh, "Feds say Bill C-27 will bring accountability to First Nations, but critics call it paternalistic, redundant", The Hill Times (October 15, 2012) online: The Hill Times <http://www.hilltimes.com/news/legislation/2012/10/15/feds-say-bill-c-27-will-bring-accountability-to-first-nations-but-critics/32437>
[27] "Rae calls Attawapiskat 'our Third World'", Canadian Press (Dec 17, 2011) online: CBC News Online <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/12/17/attawapiskat-bob-rae-visit.html>
[28] Pamela Palmater, "Bill S-2 - Family Home on Reserves: Protection or threat?", Rabble (October 3, 2011) online: Rabble.ca < http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/pamela-palmater/2011/10/bill-s-2-family-homes-reserves-protection-or-threat>
[29] Chelsea Vowel, "First Nations Property Ownership Act Just White Paper Lite" Rabble (August 23, 2012) online: Rabble.ca < http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/apihtawikosisan/2012/08/first-nations-property-ownership-act-just-white-paper-lite >
[30] "Frequently Asked Questions - Amendments to the Land DEsignation SEctions of the Indian Act", Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (August 19, 2012) online: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1350676320034/1350676521625>
[31] "Liberal Leader Bob Rae Launches Debate on His Private Members Motion to Replace the Indian Act", Liberal Party of Canada (October 22, 2012) online: Liberal.ca <http://www.liberal.ca/newsroom/news-release/liberal-leader-bob-rae-launches-debate-on-his-private-members-motion-to-replace-the-indian-act/>
[32] Brian Slattery, "The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" in John D. Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008), p. 24
[33] Bill Rafoss, "First Nations and The Charter of Rights" in John D. Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008), p. 198-205
[34] Teressa Nahanee, "Speaking Notes to the Canadian Bar Association" in Canadian Bar Association, ed, Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal Self Government (?: Canadian Bar Association, 1992)
[35] Bill Rafoss, "First Nations and The Charter of Rights" in John D. Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008), p. 199-200
[36] Bill Rafoss, "First Nations and The Charter of Rights" in John D. Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008), p. 203
[37] Tracie Lea Scott, Postcolonial Sovereignty? The Nisga'a Final Agreement (Saskatoon: Purich, 2012), p. 56-115

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